Get access

EMPLOYER RECRUITMENT STRATEGIES AND THE LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES OF NEW HIRES

Authors

  • Jed DeVaro

    1. DeVaro: Assistant Professor of Labor Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14850. Phone 1-607-255-8407, Fax 1-607-255-4496, E-mail devaro@cornell.edu
    Search for more papers by this author
    • *

      I acknowledge helpful discussions with Ron Ehrenberg, Gary Fields, Ed Lazear, Tom MaCurdy, John Pencavel, and Luigi Pistaferri. Thanks also to an anonymous referee for helpful comments. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Kapnick Foundation through a grant to the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. Finally, Dana Samuelson and Derrill Watson provided first-rate research assistance.


Abstract

The results in this article suggest, among other things, a strong association between recruitment choices and starting wages. The theoretical framework motivating the empirical analysis is a wage-posting game in which firms make wage offers and choose recruitment strategies while recognizing a trade-off between hiring speed and match quality. Introducing this theoretical framework to the recruitment literature, I present new evidence on employers' choices of recruitment methods to answer the questions “How do employer recruitment choices vary by firm and vacancy characteristics and the skill requirements of jobs?” and “How do vacancy duration and starting wages vary with recruitment choices?”(JEL MS1)

Get access to the full text of this article

Ancillary