Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues:
Rethinking the Standard Philosophical Interpretation of Moral Virtue in Aquinas
Version of Record online: 17 DEC 2002
1999 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc.
Journal of Religious Ethics
Volume 27, Issue 1, pages 3–27, Spring 1999
How to Cite
Inglis, J. (1999), Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues: . Journal of Religious Ethics, 27: 3–27. doi: 10.1111/0384-9694.00003
- Issue online: 17 DEC 2002
- Version of Record online: 17 DEC 2002
- Cited By
- William Peraldus
Aquinas is often presented as following Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics when treating moral virtue. Less often do philosophers consider that Aquinas's conception of the highest good and its relation to the functional character of human activity led him to break with Aristotle by replicating each of the acquired moral virtues on an infused level. The author suggests that we can discern reasons for this move by examining Aquinas's commentary on the Sententiae of Peter the Lombard and the Summa theologiae within their historical context. The author's thesis is that Dominican pastoral and intellectual concerns led Aquinas to argue that moral virtue must necessarily be ordered toward the highest good. Understanding this purpose helps to explain his presentation of moral virtue and its implications for standard philosophical interpretations of his work.