Veto Players and Institutional Analysis
Article first published online: 17 DEC 2002
2000Blackwell Publishers, Inc.
Volume 13, Issue 4, pages 441–474, October 2000
How to Cite
Tsebelis, G. (2000), Veto Players and Institutional Analysis. Governance, 13: 441–474. doi: 10.1111/0952-1895.00141
- Issue published online: 17 DEC 2002
- Article first published online: 17 DEC 2002
- Cited By
The veto players theory can be used to analyze all political systems regardless of regime (presidential or parliamentary), party system (one-, two-, or multiparty), and type of parliament (unicameral or multicameral). This paper develops the veto players theory to account for a series of important political phenomena: the difference between majoritarian and supermajoritarian institutions; the importance of absenteeism, or of political marginalization; the importance of agenda control and referendums; the reasons for government stability (parliamentary systems) and regime stability (presidential systems); the reasons for independence of bureaucracies, and judicial independence. All these phenomena are analyzed in a coherent way, on the basis of the same framework. Empirical evidence from existing literature corroborating the theory is provided.