Revenue Sharing and Vertical Control in the Video Rental Industry
Article first published online: 27 MAR 2003
DOI: 10.1111/1467-6451.00147
Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
Additional Information
How to Cite
Dana, Jr., J. D. and Spier, K. E. (2001), Revenue Sharing and Vertical Control in the Video Rental Industry. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 49: 223–245. doi: 10.1111/1467-6451.00147
Publication History
- Issue published online: 27 MAR 2003
- Article first published online: 27 MAR 2003
- Abstract
- Cited By
Revenue sharing contracts, in which retailers pay a royalty on sales to their suppliers, are now widely used in the video rental industry. We show that revenue sharing is valuable in vertically separated industries in which demand is either stochastic (unpredictable) or variable (e.g., systematically declining), downstream inventory is chosen before demand is realized and downstream firms engage in intrabrand competition. Unlike two-part tariffs, revenue sharing achieves the first best outcome by softening retail price competition without distorting retailers’ inventory decisions. Our theories are also consistent with trends in prices and availability following retailers’ adoption of revenue sharing contracts.

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