Vertical Foreclosure in Broadband Access?
Version of Record online: 27 MAR 2003
Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
The Journal of Industrial Economics
Volume 49, Issue 3, pages 299–318, September 2001
How to Cite
Rubinfeld, D. L. and Singer, H. J. (2001), Vertical Foreclosure in Broadband Access?. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 49: 299–318. doi: 10.1111/1467-6451.00151
- Issue online: 27 MAR 2003
- Version of Record online: 27 MAR 2003
- Cited By
The merger of AOL and Time Warner involved a vertical combination of the largest Internet content provider and aggregator and a large cable system operator which offers a conduit through which broadband customers can access Internet content at high speeds. We consider the economic incentives of such a firm to engage in two distinct vertical foreclosure strategies: (1) conduit discrimination—insulating its own conduit from competition by limiting rival platform distribution of its affiliated content and services, and (2) content discrimination—insulating its own affiliated content from competition by blocking or degrading the quality of outside content.