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I argue that Wright’s constructivist action of intention is fundamentally flawed and that the source of its error can be diagnosed by locating it within its strategic context; Wright’s response to Wittgenstein on rules. Wright deploys intentions as an analogy to disarm Kripkean scepticism. Since we can have direct knowledge of the content of our intentions, Kripke’s claim that knowledge of the content of rules cannot be direct and must be inferential is question begging. But Wright goes on to concede that a substantial explanation should be given of how first person grasp of content is possible for which he deploys constructivism. I raise a number of criticisms to show that constructivism fails to explain our knowledge of intentions. Finally I show that Wright’s failure fits into a pattern anticipated by Wittgenstein. The ongoing judgments that are supposed to determine the content of intentions are like the interpretations of rules which fail because they stand in need of further interpretation. Contra Wright I claim that the moral of the rule following considerations is precisely that no substantial answer can be given to the question of how the content of mental states can be grasped. The phenomenon of mental content must simply be presupposed and not reductively explained.