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Stephen Boulter, in The Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (1998), pp. 504–13, attacks John Haldane's proposed account of the relationship between mind and world based on Aquinas' theory of cognition. Boulter argues against Haldane's attempt to square metaphysical realism with semantic anti-realism. I argue that even if metaphysical realism and a full-bodied semantic anti-realism may be incompatible, from the stance of the mind-world identity theory, one may nevertheless maintain metaphysical realism together with the negation of semantic realism. I suggest that this is what Haldane actually claimed, and moreover that Aquinas would have accepted it. Aquinas' analogy-based semantics enlarges the recognitional capacities of speakers, and one's capacity to recognize a fact empirically is different from one's capacity to form thoughts about a fact.