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The Philosophy of Thomas Reid
The Problem with Reid's Direct Realism
Article first published online: 7 JAN 2003
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00280
The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2002.
1467-9213/asset/cover.gif?v=1&s=4c88bb37c0d1ac3a4cdf1f9c54754f293a87d73c "The Philosophical Quarterly")
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How to Cite
Buras, J. T. (2002), The Problem with Reid's Direct Realism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 52: 457–477. doi: 10.1111/1467-9213.00280
Publication History
- Issue published online: 7 JAN 2003
- Article first published online: 7 JAN 2003
- Abstract
- References
- Cited By
There is a problem about the compatibility of Reid's commitment to both a sign theory of sensations and also direct realism. I show that Reid is committed to three different senses of the claim that mind-independent bodies and their qualities are among the immediate objects of perception, and I then argue that Reid's sign theory conflicts with one of these. I conclude by advocating one proposal for reconciling Reid's claims, deferring a thorough development and defence of the proposal to another paper.