The Philosophy of Thomas Reid
Reid, Kant and the Philosophy of Mind
Version of Record online: 7 JAN 2003
The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2002.
The Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 52, Issue 209, pages 495–510, October 2002
How to Cite
Brun-Rovet, E. (2002), Reid, Kant and the Philosophy of Mind. The Philosophical Quarterly, 52: 495–510. doi: 10.1111/1467-9213.00282
- Issue online: 7 JAN 2003
- Version of Record online: 7 JAN 2003
I suggest a possible rehabilitation of Reid's philosophy of mind by a constructive use of Kant's criticisms of the common sense tradition. Kant offers two criticisms, explicitly claiming that common sense philosophy is ill directed methodologically, and implicitly rejecting Reid's view that there is direct epistemological access by introspection to the ontology of mind. Putting the two views together reveals a tension between epistemology and ontology, but the problem which Kant finds in Reid also infects his own system, as his weaker ontological claims are undermined to such an extent by the necessary reintroduction of self-consciousness that the justification he seeks for reason fails to be reached epistemologically. Plausible solutions to these parallel tensions imply that both Reid and Kant have a pre-systematic concept of mind, and may lead to the conclusion that Reid's method is more economical in the elaboration of an ontology for the philosophy of mind.