The Philosophy of Thomas Reid
How to Reid Moore
Article first published online: 7 JAN 2003
The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2002.
The Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 52, Issue 209, pages 544–563, October 2002
How to Cite
Greco, J. (2002), How to Reid Moore. The Philosophical Quarterly, 52: 544–563. doi: 10.1111/1467-9213.00285
- Issue published online: 7 JAN 2003
- Article first published online: 7 JAN 2003
Moore's ‘Proof of an External World’ has evoked a variety of responses from philosophers, including bafflement, indignation and sympathetic reconstruction. I argue that Moore should be understood as following Reid on a variety of points, both epistemological and methodological. Moreover, Moore and Reid are exactly right on all of these points. Hence what I present is a defence of Moore's ‘Proof’, as well as an interpretation. Finally, I argue that the Reid-Moore position is useful for resolving an issue that has recently received attention in epistemology, namely, how is it that one knows that one is not a brain in a vat?