Professionals Play Minimax
Article first published online: 3 JUL 2003
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00249
Additional Information
How to Cite
Palacios-Huerta, I. (2003), Professionals Play Minimax. Review of Economic Studies, 70: 395–415. doi: 10.1111/1467-937X.00249
Publication History
- Issue published online: 3 JUL 2003
- Article first published online: 3 JUL 2003
- Received on September 2001 and accepted for publication on October 2002
- Abstract
- Article
- References
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The implications of the Minimax theorem are tested using natural data. The tests use a unique data set from penalty kicks in professional soccer games. In this natural setting experts play a one-shot two-person zero-sum game. The results of the tests are remarkably consistent with equilibrium play in every respect: (i) winning probabilities are statistically identical across strategies for players; (ii) players’ choices are serially independent. The tests have substantial power to distinguish equilibrium play from disequilibrium alternatives. These results represent the first time that both implications of von Neumann's Minimax theorem are supported under natural conditions.

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