Connectionism and the Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science

  1. Terence Horgan

Article first published online: 6 JUN 2003

DOI: 10.1111/1467-9973.00039

Issue

Metaphilosophy

Metaphilosophy

Volume 28, Issue 1-2, pages 1–30, January 1997

Additional Information

How to Cite

Horgan, T. (1997), Connectionism and the Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science. Metaphilosophy, 28: 1–30. doi: 10.1111/1467-9973.00039

Author Information

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, USA

Publication History

  1. Issue published online: 6 JUN 2003
  2. Article first published online: 6 JUN 2003

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Keywords:

  • Connectionism;
  • Connectionist Network;
  • Cognition;
  • Cognitive Science;
  • Computation;
  • Dynamics;
  • Dynamical System;
  • Eliminativism;
  • Folk Psychology;
  • Foundations of Cognitive Science;
  • Language of Thought;
  • Mind;
  • Neural Network

This is an overview of recent philosophical discussion about connectionism and the foundations of cognitive science. Connectionist modeling in cognitive science is described. Three broad conceptions of the mind are characterized, and their comparative strengths and weaknesses are discussed: (1) the classical computation conception in cognitive science; (2) a popular foundational interpretation of connectionism that John Tienson and I call “non-sentential computationalism”; and (3) an alternative interpretation of connectionism we call “dynamical cognition.” Also discussed are two recent philosophical attempts to enlist connectionism in defense of eliminativism about folk psychology.

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