What’s Wrong With Infinite Regresses?
Version of Record online: 24 JAN 2003
The Metaphilosophy Foundation and Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2001
Volume 32, Issue 5, pages 523–538, October 2001
How to Cite
Nolan, D. (2001), What’s Wrong With Infinite Regresses?. Metaphilosophy, 32: 523–538. doi: 10.1111/1467-9973.00206
- Issue online: 24 JAN 2003
- Version of Record online: 24 JAN 2003
- Cited By
It is almost universally believed that some infinite regresses are vicious, and also almost universally believed that some are benign. In this paper I argue that regresses can be vicious for several different sorts of reasons. Furthermore, I claim that some intuitively vicious regresses do not suffer from any of the particular aetiologies that guarantee viciousness to regresses, but are nevertheless so on the basis of considerations of parsimony. The difference between some apparently benign and some apparently vicious regresses, then, turns out to be a matter of a more general assessment of costs and benefits, making viciousness of regresses in some cases less of a local matter than is usually thought.