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In Defence of Narrow Mindedness
Article first published online: 17 DEC 2002
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0017.00108
Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1999
1468-0017/asset/cover.gif?v=1&s=3b37ef302942d534f318699c81731b2a373ee3ce "Mind & Language")
Additional Information
How to Cite
Egan, F. (1999), In Defence of Narrow Mindedness. Mind & Language, 14: 177–194. doi: 10.1111/1468-0017.00108
Publication History
- Issue published online: 17 DEC 2002
- Article first published online: 17 DEC 2002
- Abstract
- Cited By
Externalism about the mind holds that the explanation of our representational capacities requires appeal to mental states that are individuated by reference to features of the environment. Externalists claim that ‘narrow’ taxonomies cannot account for important features of psychological explanation. I argue that this claim is false, and offer a general argument for preferring narrow taxonomies in psychology.