Problems with Principle P
Version of Record online: 17 DEC 2002
1997 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 78, Issue 3, pages 261–277, September 1997
How to Cite
Caplin, H. (1997), Problems with Principle P. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 78: 261–277. doi: 10.1111/1468-0114.00039
- Issue online: 17 DEC 2002
- Version of Record online: 17 DEC 2002
- Cited By
Abstract: In Psychosemantics Fodor presents three arguments for preferring the language of thought over mere intentional realism - arguments for the conclusion that intentional causes of behavior have constituent structure. The first of these, relying on the methodological ‘Principle P’, is considered in detail here and is found wanting. This principle does not prefer the language of thought to those very connectionist systems which Fodor criticizes; and it rests on dubious theoretical and empirical assumptions.