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Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games
Article first published online: 10 DEC 2003
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00156
Econometric Society 2000
1468-0262/asset/cover.gif?v=1&s=5a013420fd2981ab4b58b64fcf8a1a99d4bd6645 "Econometrica")
Additional Information
How to Cite
Haller, H. and Lagunoff, R. (2000), Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games. Econometrica, 68: 1231–1248. doi: 10.1111/1468-0262.00156
Publication History
- Issue published online: 10 DEC 2003
- Article first published online: 10 DEC 2003
- Abstract
- References
- Cited By
Keywords:
- Stochastic games;
- Markov perfect equilibria;
- genericity.
This paper examines Markov perfect equilibria of general, finite state stochastic games. Our main result is that the number of such equilibria is finite for a set of stochastic game payoffs with full Lebesgue measure. We further discuss extensions to lower dimensional stochastic games like the alternating move game.