A MATCHING MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS SKILL REQUIREMENTS>*

  1. JAMES ALBRECHT,
  2. SUSAN VROMAN1

Article first published online: 9 OCT 2008

DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00012

Issue

International Economic Review

International Economic Review

Volume 43, Issue 1, pages 283–305, February 2002

Additional Information

How to Cite

ALBRECHT, J. and VROMAN1, S. (2002), A MATCHING MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS SKILL REQUIREMENTS>*. International Economic Review, 43: 283–305. doi: 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00012

Author Information

  1. Georgetown University, U.S.A.

* James Albrecht Department of Economics, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057-1036. Phone: 202-687-6105. Fax: 202-687-6102. E-mail: albrecht@georgetown.edu.

Publication History

  1. Issue published online: 9 OCT 2008
  2. Article first published online: 9 OCT 2008

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We consider a labor market in which workers differ in their abilities and jobs differ in their skill requirements. The distribution of worker abilities is exogenous, but we model the choice of skill requirements by firms. High-skill jobs produce more output than low-skill jobs, but high-skill jobs require high-skill workers and thus are more difficult to fill. We use a matching model together with a Nash bargaining approach to wage setting to determine the equilibrium mix of job types, along with the equilibrium relationship between worker and job characteristics, wages, and unemployment.

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