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Keywords:

  • state rescaling;
  • state space;
  • developmental state;
  • politics of scale;
  • regionalism;
  • South Korea

Abstract

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. Introduction
  4. Theoretical background
  5. Re-examination of state rescaling in the context of developmental state-building
  6. Territorial coalition, competing regionalisms, and conditions for fracturing hegemony
  7. Research context: the hegemonic crisis of the developmental regime
  8. The production of state space and its coherence in the 1960s
  9. The rise of regionalism as a bottom-up rescaling process
  10. Conclusion
  11. References
  12. Supporting Information

This study is informed by the theorizing prompted by recent work on state rescaling. I aim to examine the interaction between the top-down and bottom-up rescaling processes that took place in the South Korean developmental state during the late 1960s and early 1970s. I focus on a regionalism that both built a regional scale and influenced the hegemonic crisis of the ruling regime. Specifically, the study illustrates the features of state space that were shaped during the developmental era and the factors that allow state space to be stable and coherent. By dealing with these questions, I provide a possible interpretation of why and how regionalism was a crucial factor in the hegemonic crisis of the 1960s and generated a rescaling of state space. What makes this study significant is not merely the fact that this space is located in East Asia. It could also, more generally, open up an alternative perspective on state rescaling during the early stages of state-led industrialization.


Introduction

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. Introduction
  4. Theoretical background
  5. Re-examination of state rescaling in the context of developmental state-building
  6. Territorial coalition, competing regionalisms, and conditions for fracturing hegemony
  7. Research context: the hegemonic crisis of the developmental regime
  8. The production of state space and its coherence in the 1960s
  9. The rise of regionalism as a bottom-up rescaling process
  10. Conclusion
  11. References
  12. Supporting Information

Recent work on state rescaling has been a persuasive alternative both to the hyper-globalist perspective and the fetishism of the local, and has contributed to a reconsideration of the nation-state as a major analytic category. It has also deepened social science's theoretical understanding of state spatiality insofar as it is demarcated by and corresponds with state power. As more research on state rescaling has been conducted, however, it has come in for criticism from several perspectives. Cox (2009), a representative critic, points out three limitations: (1) Euro-centricity — the literature on state rescaling has been dominated by European states; (2) a top-down approach — state rescaling is frequently depicted as a process that is necessarily centrally initiated; and (3) periodization — state space and its rescaling have usually been examined with provisos associated with periodization, such as ‘along with’ or ‘after’ globalization.

As far as these limitations are concerned, geographic coverage seems to have been considerably broadened in recent years, from Western Europe to non-European countries (see Chung, 2007; Sonn, 2010; Tsukamoto, 2012). The tendency for research to be weighted toward a top-down approach has also begun to change, through, for example, the emphasis on interscalar tensions between the national and local scales (Park, 2008) or regionalist discursive practices with regard to hegemonic projects (Oosterlynck, 2010). Likewise, the periodization problem is now being tackled, even though it has been getting less attention than the other two. Notwithstanding these changes, however, significant research questions on a range of spatio-temporal matrices of actual nation-states remain unanswered, not least because they could meaningfully vary across temporal and spatial horizons and in the forms of combination and tension involved between top-down and bottom-up processes.

With these problem orientations, my aim in this article is to elucidate the rescaling of the South Korean developmental state during the 1960s and the early 1970s, focusing on a regionalism that built a regional scale and influenced the hegemonic crisis of the ruling regime. The importance of this study lies not merely in the fact that this temporal space is located in East Asia. It could also open up an alternative perspective on state rescaling in the early stages of state-led industrialization. A few major urban areas experienced explosive population growth and rapid industrialization, while predominantly rural areas were excluded from the spatial production of the developmental state, especially from industrialization and its so-called ‘modernization of the fatherland’. Specifically, this study targets two research questions. First, what features of state space were shaped during the first phase of the ‘Great Transformation’ (Polanyi, 2001) during the 1960s, and how did the state space remain relatively stable and coherent during that period? Second, why and how was southwestern regionalism a crucial factor in fracturing the hegemony of the 1960s and rescaling the state space? In other words, why did the ruling regime respond to regionalism?

Theoretical background

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. Introduction
  4. Theoretical background
  5. Re-examination of state rescaling in the context of developmental state-building
  6. Territorial coalition, competing regionalisms, and conditions for fracturing hegemony
  7. Research context: the hegemonic crisis of the developmental regime
  8. The production of state space and its coherence in the 1960s
  9. The rise of regionalism as a bottom-up rescaling process
  10. Conclusion
  11. References
  12. Supporting Information

A theory of East Asian developmental states might start by elucidating their actuality after emptying ‘the actual’ of Europe.1 Scale is the ‘real structure’ of social space that emerges out of a territorial trap and methodological nationalism (Brenner, 2004). Actual scales are shaped in accordance with the way in which social processes are scaled. Similarly, states have spaces and are organized in accordance with the scaling of actual state processes. In this sense, therefore, we need to re-examine the existing analytical framework for state rescaling, which best fits more stable and static societies, in order to examine the actual state rescaling that took place in South Korea during its dynamic developmental era.

Re-examination of state rescaling in the context of developmental state-building

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. Introduction
  4. Theoretical background
  5. Re-examination of state rescaling in the context of developmental state-building
  6. Territorial coalition, competing regionalisms, and conditions for fracturing hegemony
  7. Research context: the hegemonic crisis of the developmental regime
  8. The production of state space and its coherence in the 1960s
  9. The rise of regionalism as a bottom-up rescaling process
  10. Conclusion
  11. References
  12. Supporting Information

Here I shall re-examine the work of Neil Brenner (2004), whose contribution to understanding state rescaling has been seminal as regards the actuality of European rescaling. He successfully combines Lefebvre's state space (2009) and Jessop's state theory (1990) into an integrated framework and provides a sophisticated analysis driven by three concepts — ‘state spatial form’, ‘state spatial project’ and ‘state spatial strategy’ (Brenner, 2004: 88) — using terms originating with Jessop (1990). However, they require further refinement and correction to deal with the following three challenges.

The first is the periodization problem connected with the rapid transformation that takes place during the developmental era, that is, industrial transformation and a rapid, fully-fledged shift in the fabric of state space. Periodization, basically, depends on a distinction between continuity and discontinuity, which roughly correspond to a ‘structural coupling’ and ‘strategic moment’ respectively (Jessop, 1990: 6).2

What, then, can we say about the developmental period of South Korea? The whole developmental era, for at least 20 years after 1961, was marked by nation- and state-building (see Kim and Vogel, 2011) and by various discontinuities for which the idea of ‘contemporaneous non-contemporaneity’ (Bloch, 1991: 97–116) might be more appropriate. It could be both difficult and insufficient, therefore, to configure the actual coupling with a single term such as the ‘Listian Warfare National State’ (Cho and Jessop, 2001). Nevertheless, the 1960s is an indispensable period for examining the capitalist industrialization of South Korea, even though the state and state space were incessantly changing and hardly identifiable as a homogenous continuity. That being the case, this article defines the period as a transitional one dominated by strategic coordination and focuses on the field of capital accumulation strategies, state projects and hegemonic projects.

The second question is the relevance of adding the modifier ‘spatial’ in front of Jessop's terminologies. Drawing on strategic-relational state theory, Brenner deduces three core concepts — state spatial form, state spatial project and state spatial strategy — from state form, state project and state strategy respectively (Brenner, 2004: 91).3 Strategic coordination cannot, however, be reduced to explicit spatial projects and strategies; it should also include implicit ones that may contribute to shaping the state space. Furthermore, a hegemonic project is not spatialized like a ‘spatial hegemonic project’, even though its spatial production, like a territorial imagination, may be a crucial part of state space. In dealing with this issue, Oosterlynck (2010: 1156) states: ‘hegemonic projects or state spatial strategies aimed at maintaining hegemony within civil society gradually disappear from the analysis’. When perceived this way, the modifier ‘spatial’ may pose unnecessary limitations that make it difficult to draw the full meaning from Lefebvre's ‘production of space’ (Lefebvre, 1991). So, in this article, I will remove the modifier and examine the spatial production of state projects and strategies (especially hegemonic projects).

The final problem is the distinction between the capital accumulation strategy and the state project during this period. The developmental regime of South Korea maintained an ‘overdeveloped state’, in which military elites and bureaucrats had exclusive power (Choi, 1993). This was especially true of the state–capital relation. The ruling regime of the time was marked by mercantilistic features that led to it being called ‘pseudo-capitalism’ (Kwon, 2006: 194). In particular, jaebols (also spelled chaebols) — big conglomerates like the Japanese Zaibatsu — were mobilized to receive foreign loans and get advice on industrial policies. The mercantilist relationship between state and capital prevents us from disentangling the state projects from the accumulation strategies.

Territorial coalition, competing regionalisms, and conditions for fracturing hegemony

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. Introduction
  4. Theoretical background
  5. Re-examination of state rescaling in the context of developmental state-building
  6. Territorial coalition, competing regionalisms, and conditions for fracturing hegemony
  7. Research context: the hegemonic crisis of the developmental regime
  8. The production of state space and its coherence in the 1960s
  9. The rise of regionalism as a bottom-up rescaling process
  10. Conclusion
  11. References
  12. Supporting Information

The recent literature has discussed the shortcomings of the top-down approach and demonstrated how territorial politics can perform significant roles in state rescaling and assimilate to the multiple roles of ‘top-down’ regulation (Jonas and Pincetl, 2006; Park, 2008; Moisio, 2008). Taking into account ‘politics of scale’, in particular from the viewpoint of territorial coalitions, it is generally acknowledged that ‘jumping scales’ (Smith, 1993) or ‘spaces of engagement’ (Cox, 1998) are representative strategies. Both of them presuppose the transition of a political agenda from one scale to another that can mobilize sources of power outside the space of dependence (see Park, 2008; Cox, 1998). In this article, I put forward one more spatial dimension to figure out how these strategies can increase their negotiating power in ‘spaces of engagement’, and its effectiveness, through ‘jumping scale’. That dimension, simply stated, is region building.

Ever since Gilbert's (1988) monumental work, ‘region’ has not been defined merely as a scale that requires an association with other historical scales, such as the national or urban ones (Brenner, 2009), but also as a territory that is shaped physically, symbolically and institutionally (Paasi, 1996). In particular, the boundaries of regions, as discursive products, allow the people within them to imagine their community and distinguish themselves from outsiders. Given that the region and its boundaries are objects of the imagination, discursive practices are supposed to be involved in region building. By the same token, regionalism can be, by definition, the discursive practice that ‘seeks to achieve legitimacy for definitions of boundaries and to obtain approval for this definition in cultural and political, and popular and official understandings’ (Thrift and Kitchin, 2009: 294).

However, not all attempts to build regions can succeed in cracking a hegemony or in bottom-up rescaling, as a matter of course. Thus, the key question is: under what conditions can bottom-up regionalism win out in a competition with top-down regionalism,4 which has more available authorities and institutional instruments? In connection with this issue, I wish to propose two hypothetical criteria: (1) the spatial coherence of the state process, and (2) the multi-scalar agent.

The concept of coherence recurs frequently with regard to state space in Brenner (2004: 92–4). He proposes two interrelated concepts, ‘territorial coherence’ and ‘interscalar coordination’, which usually refer to the coherence of the territorial dimension and the scalar dimension respectively, although they have not been clearly defined and distinguished from each other. According to Jessop (1990: 359), strategic coordination may influence systems and structures ‘only when the strategic interventions of social forces are well coordinated and coherent’. In this article, I will use the term ‘spatial coherence’ of strategic coordination, in an integrated sense, rather than as two separate terms, because coherence requires a proper spatial organization in both the territorial and scalar dimensions simultaneously.

Here we must recall the argument put forward in this article that non-spatial projects and state strategies, including hegemonic projects and capital accumulation strategies, can also contribute to the production of state space, even if the result and the selectivity are unintended consequences. Specifically, I take as my point of analysis Jessop's (2002: 42) subcategories of the state project: the political project and the governmental project. The political projects ‘articulated by different social forces that are represented within the state system, seek such representation, or contest its current forms, functions and activities’; the latter connotes the ‘prevailing state project with its raison d'état — or governmental rationality — and statecraft that seeks to impose a relative unity on the various activities of different branches, departments and scales of the state system’ (using ‘state project’ in the narrow sense).

This article tackles the issue of the selectivities of the political, governmental and hegemonic projects mentioned above and their coherence. Elucidating the selectivities of the projects and examining their coherence will shed light on how the production of space has rendered hegemony stable in the spatial dimension. Given that the morphological coherence of state spatial processes can be confirmed, it is certainly worth inquiring into the possibility of hegemony being cracked by political practices, such as regionalist movements, that threaten the spatial coherence of state processes.

Here, I would like to propose another hypothetical criterion. In developing the framework for integrating the top-down and bottom-up approaches, another difficult question that has to be dealt with is how regionalisms can be involved in strategic relations of the state. Although Brenner (2004) leaves the door open for the intervention of regionalist factions in these relations, we need to consider links that can enable certain local agendas to ‘jump scale’ and forge a ‘space of engagement’. This study pays especial attention to multi-scalar agents who carry out multifaceted roles varying among different scales — who, in other words, have agency ‘as the stream of actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings’ (Giddens, 1993: 81) in the social relations of several scales at the same time. In this context, the agents can be multi-scalar nodes connected to the various scales of social relations that appear to play a part in strategic solidarity and competition by articulating bottom-up regionalism to the space of engagement.

Research context: the hegemonic crisis of the developmental regime

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. Introduction
  4. Theoretical background
  5. Re-examination of state rescaling in the context of developmental state-building
  6. Territorial coalition, competing regionalisms, and conditions for fracturing hegemony
  7. Research context: the hegemonic crisis of the developmental regime
  8. The production of state space and its coherence in the 1960s
  9. The rise of regionalism as a bottom-up rescaling process
  10. Conclusion
  11. References
  12. Supporting Information

In order to provide a research context, in this section we will briefly examine the trajectory of economic growth and its spatial and political result. As of the late 1950s, the only industrialized areas in South Korea were a number of cities, such as Seoul, Daegu and Busan, along the Gyeongbu (Seoul–Busan) railway (see Figure 1 and Figure S4). This geographical feature was the result of two historical conditions: Japanese colonial industrial development and the Korean War (Park, 2003: 823). This does not mean, however, that the cities were flourishing as industrial sites. It was not until the 1960s that the full-fledged industrialization of South Korea began. As shown in Figure S15 in the Supporting Information, the 1960s marked a milestone in the economic achievement of ‘South Korea, Inc.’. Both GDP (gross domestic product) and gross fixed capital formation increased sharply after the mid-1960s, indicating a quantitative expansion in the size of the economy and capital investment respectively.

figure

Figure 1. Map of Korea

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As industrialization progressed, the share of manufacturing and construction (secondary industry) in GDP increased rapidly during the 1960s, especially in the latter half of the decade (see Figure S2). During the same period, the share of agriculture and fisheries (primary industry) decreased from 41% to 26% (see Figure S2), and the farming population also declined from 58% to 45% (Bank of Korea, 1972: 6). This was also the period when the rural population started to move to urban areas. The proportion of urban residents in the population as a whole was only 28% in 1960; this had increased to 41% by 1970.6 All of this took place over just 10 years, and the pace of change was sustained throughout the decade (Chang, 2007).

As is well known, this achievement arose from the so-called state-led industrialization of the developmental state in South Korea. What we can draw from this rather hackneyed formulation is that the 1960s might be considered the initial stage of the ‘Great Transformation’ in the sense that the modern market economy and the modern nation-state were interlocked and co-evolved. However, the political regime supporting the outstanding growth of the 1960s experienced a hegemonic crisis. In 1969, President Jung-Hee Park, who had taken power after the coup d'état of 16 May 1961, amended the constitution so as to allow the president a third term and enable himself to run in the 1971 presidential election. The national support he had gained during the economic growth of the 1960s was weakened by criticism from students, the intelligentsia and the urban middle class (Kim, 1995). A series of regionalist campaigns in the southwest, however, can be considered the most serious challenge that Park faced.

Park won the presidential election of 1971 (with 53.2% of the vote against 45.3%), but the sense of exclusion from industrialization was a potentially serious vulnerability of developmentalism. Compared with the 1967 election results, the 1971 election stands out in two ways. First, simply put, Park gained more votes overall in 1971 than in 1967, as Table 1 shows. Second, despite these gains, Park's support in the top six major cities and the southwest region decreased by 6.2% and 8.9%, respectively. In particular, support for Park in the southwest in the 1971 election was a mere 34.8%. The necessity for government intervention and bribery to fix the results of the 1971 election — for which there is considerable evidence — could be considered a defeat for Park and the ruling regime (Lee, 1998: 221). Kim Dae-Jung, the main opposition candidate and a congressman from Gwangju in South Jeolla, presented the first substantial threat to the ruling regime since the coup. What on earth happened in the southwest during the late 1960s and early 1970s? Why did they vote against Park? That is the key question to be asked in the discussion below.

Table 1. Percentages of support for President Park Jung-Hee and the main opposition candidate out of total valid votes, by region, in presidential elections (1967–71)
Provinces19671971Change in Park's Support Rate
ParkYoonParkKim
  1. a

    Major cities with more than 100,000 voters

  2. b

    Southwest region includes North and South Jeolla

Source: National Election Commission http://www.nec.go.kr/sinfo/index.html (accessed 3.5.12)
Seoul metropolitan citya45.251.340.059.4−5.2
Gyeonggi41.052.648.949.57.9
Incheona39.156.742.156.93.0
Gangwon51.341.759.838.88.6
North Chungcheong46.643.657.340.710.7
South Chungcheong45.446.853.544.48.1
Daejeona49.346.348.650.6−0.7
North Gyeongsang64.026.475.623.311.6
Daegua71.523.567.032.3−4.5
South Gyeongsang68.623.073.425.64.7
Busan metropolitan citya64.231.255.743.6−8.6
Jeju56.532.156.941.40.3
Southwest regionb43.747.434.862.38.9
North Jeolla42.348.735.561.5−6.8
South Jeolla44.646.634.462.8−10.1
Gwangjua40.954.522.776.0−18.2
Top six major cities51.744.245.553.86.2
Total51.440.953.245.31.8

The production of state space and its coherence in the 1960s

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. Introduction
  4. Theoretical background
  5. Re-examination of state rescaling in the context of developmental state-building
  6. Territorial coalition, competing regionalisms, and conditions for fracturing hegemony
  7. Research context: the hegemonic crisis of the developmental regime
  8. The production of state space and its coherence in the 1960s
  9. The rise of regionalism as a bottom-up rescaling process
  10. Conclusion
  11. References
  12. Supporting Information

The spatial production of state projects

I now examine the key state projects implicitly connected to accumulation strategies. The foremost state project in 1960 was the centralization of political power, the so-called ‘developmental dictatorship’ (Kwon, 2006) or ‘bureaucratic authoritarian regime’ (Im, 1987). Here, a couple of policy programs materialized and, whether they were intended to or not, overlapped with the formation of the industrial spaces.

The Economic Planning Board as a state project: monopolizing rent on the national scale

The establishment of the Economic Planning Board (hereafter EPB) in 1961 was a major change in both the governmental and political projects. Although there were similar organizations in Taiwan and Japan, the EPB enjoyed greater powers and status (Yoon, 2001). First of all, the head of the EPB was also the deputy prime minister, and budget authority was transferred to the board from the Ministry of Finance. Budget planning can exert a most powerful influence on a state's policy priorities and is also the instrument controlling the authoritative distribution of values (Peters, 1979: 349) and permission to introduce foreign capital. Large foreign loans can increase a state's autonomy from its society by reducing the share of resources supplied domestically. In addition, the EPB considerably restricted other departments' authority and monopolized the authority to decide economic policy while operating outside the National Assembly's oversight.

Significantly, the EPB had, along with jurisdiction over budget planning, various policy tools by which to intervene in the financial market, such as supporting export, reforming interest rates and guaranteeing foreign loans. We see here that the EPB's monopolistic use of these financial tools created immense rent on a national scale.7 According to a study, the total rent generated through the control of capital flow increased from 8% of GNP in 1960 to 26% in 1970 (Kim, 1999: 133). The rent was built up on the national scale and channelled into a specific area by the EPB. Since the EPB had no branches on other scales, the flow of rent was entirely controlled by the central government, particularly the EPB, and its decision-making criteria were based on the national scale.

Elimination of local autonomy as a political project

The ‘Military Revolutionary Committee’ that gained power after the coup d'état of 16 May 1961 disbanded the nation's local assemblies by handing down Decree No. 4 the same day. The committee announced that this was just an interim measure. The military government repeatedly claimed to support the revival of local autonomy after enacting a new constitution, explicitly stating that it would try to implement it. Moreover, a constitutional amendment, confirmed by national referendum in 1962, included regulations for local autonomy. However, no law executing local autonomy was enacted during Jung-Hee Park's regime. Even under the Yushin constitution, which gave the president virtually unlimited power and tenure, Park's regime absolutely refused to discuss local autonomy by adding the supplementary provision that local assemblies should not be established until the reunification of the country.

The elimination of local autonomy naturally forestalled the possibility of sharing rent, monopolized by the establishment of the EPB, between the national and subnational scales. Local autonomy and the vitalization of local politics are elements that go against state projects that concentrate power on the national scale, as they open up political space for territorialized stakeholders. This political project thus ensured that the EPB, with no lower branches (even within the central government), would keep its rent on the national scale.

Jaebols as the mercantilist assistants: territorially uneven distribution

Kwon (2006) and Sonn (2006) define the jaebol of the time as a ‘mercantilist assistant’ and a ‘sub-structure of state authority’, respectively. They describe jaebols as important partners in the establishment of industrialization strategies. Their roles included providing the information considered key to the production of the industrial space used to link with overseas capital and reviewing the facilities to be used for its introduction. Kim (1990) points out that a micro motivation of power, namely seeking to decrease uncertainty (a concept used in the field of organizational theory), gave birth to the spatial selectivity of the bureaucracy. This attempt is defined as a rational selection for reducing uncertainty and transaction costs by choosing entrepreneurs from the southeast, the home province of President Park and other ruling elites, in a situation in which legitimacy was lacking — after the coup d'état. His claim provides a useful view that the spatial selectivity of jaebols was produced by the governmental project to secure the legitimacy of the regime.

Fifty out of the 56 people selected as key entrepreneurs in 1972 were self-made founders who had benefited from the economic growth that began after the military coup in 1961 (Oh, 1975). Cha (1981) builds on this fact, pointing out that 15 (or 54%) of 28 key businesspeople who started in the 1950s had failed by the 1960s, while another 32 started and grew quickly during the 1960s. When we look closely at the ups and downs of company activities by region, the distribution of economic elites is clearly uneven. The share of founders of large companies born in South Gyeongsang and North Gyeongsang provinces is higher than for other regions (see Table S1). This territorial unevenness became a major variable affecting the location of industrial complexes and subsequent state capital investment.

Two accumulation strategies and two industrial spaces

The capital accumulation strategies and governmental projects of the 1960s were entangled, as discussed above. In other words, accumulation strategies were largely determined by the industrial strategies and policies of the state. In this connection we could highlight two industrial strategies: the import substitution industrialization strategy (hereafter ISI) and the export-oriented industrialization strategy (hereafter EOI). Both strategies produced their own industrial spaces more explicitly than any of the other state projects mentioned above, although the spatial productions of the projects were simultaneously overlapped and interwoven. The ISI and the EOI cultivated Ulsan and Guro, respectively, as industrial strongholds.

The ISI and Ulsan Industrial Center

Jung-Hee Park's regime announced the First Five-year Economic Development Plan (1962–6) and proclaimed the project of self-sustained economic growth and the ISI strategy on 5 January 1962 (Rhee, 1994: 61). The production of state space, as demanded by the ISI, was carried out throughout the 1960s, although the ISI strategy was replaced by EOI after the revision of the plan in 1964. In particular, investment in basic industries was concentrated on the Ulsan Industrial Center (UIC) under the Chemical Industry Five-Year Plan. The amount invested by the government to construct the UIC amounted to 7.7% of the total amount invested during the first five-year economic development plan. Moreover, 24.8% of total mining and manufacturing investment flowed into the UIC (Chang, 2007: 33).

The first five-year plan started with a list of chemical industrial plants to be constructed. However, the questions of who, where and how had not been decided (Oh, 1995: 18). Thirteen entrepreneurs who had been accused of amassing wealth unlawfully in 1961 were selected to implement the construction. They founded the Korean Industries Association (now the Federation of Korean Industries, a jaebol interest group; hereafter the KIA) and sent two teams to the United States and Western Europe to attract foreign investment. After the investigation, Byung-Chul Lee (chairman of the KIA and founder of Samsung) proposed that a special industrial complex be established at an appropriate location as soon as possible (Oh, 1995: 23). Thus began the establishment of the UIC.

Before the establishment of the UIC was undertaken, a special law expropriating land for the industrial district was announced on 20 January 1962. On 27 January, only a week after the law was enacted, Ulsan was designated as a special industrial district. The EPB immediately took the initiative in the construction and management of the UIC (EPB, 1962). The concrete location of the complex was influenced by jaebols' interests, although Ulsan offers favourable conditions for the establishment of port facilities, particularly thanks to its tidal range, a mere 0.85 m (Chang, 2007: 24); additionally, it already had considerable infrastructure dating back to Japanese colonial rule (Kim, D.-W. 1989: 180–1). A strong will to construct the UIC can be clearly seen in Byung-Chul Lee's memoir (Lee, 1986), and Yeon-Soo Kim, a leading jaebol who had already built a number of plants in Ulsan, also advised the KIA to select Ulsan as the location of the chemical complex (Lee, 2008).

No other places were produced by the above-mentioned governmental projects and accumulation strategies. The UIC was almost the only industrial space where state-created rents were actualized and utilized to stimulate industrial development. The authority to establish and manage the UIC belonged almost completely to agents and their social contacts on the national scale.

Construction of the industrial complexes for the EOI: Guro as a replication of Ulsan

The ISI strategy was soon modified. When South Korea faced a foreign-currency crisis in 1964, the United States demanded that it modify its policies and economic development plan (Lee, 2006: 154). This economic crisis and strained US–Korea relations caused the government to give up on its original plan. After this strategic turn in 1964, the EOI strategy was pursued aggressively. Since then, the industrialization of Korea has been successful, at least from the standpoint of quantity. The strategic detour through the labour-intensive EOI offered an opportunity for large cities, such as Seoul, Daegu and Busan, to take a quantum leap.

When the EOI strategy was announced, the KIA explained the current status of products exported to Japan and the technological capability of Japanese–Korean companies during a seminar on economic issues held on 8 January 1963. As a result, the government promised to adopt policies supporting the development of export-oriented industries (Korea Export Industrial Corporation, 1994: 141–2). In March of the same year, the Export Industry Promotion Committee was formed. Its first initiative was to dispatch an EOI inspection group to Japan on 15 March 1963, in order to observe the industrial environment of Japan's export industries and attract Japanese-Korean businesspeople. During the visit, they demanded the construction of an industrial complex like the UIC near Seoul (ibid.: 145–6). Attracting capital from the United States and Japan was necessary for industrialization after several financial policies enacted during the previous phase had failed. The result was the export industrial complexes in Guro (in south-western Seoul) and Bupyeong (next to Guro) along with supporting organizations, such as the Export Industrial Complex Promotion Committee and the Korea Export Industrial Corporation in the public sector and the Export Industry Promotion Committee in the private sector (see Figure 1).

The hegemonic project and its contribution to spatial coherence

Precarious coherence among spatial productions by state projects and accumulation strategies

The governmental projects and accumulation strategies for rapid industrialization and the political projects pursued to stabilize power shortly after the coup overlapped and were interwoven within the two industrial spaces. The accumulation strategies and the governmental projects that supported the strategies led to a concentration of institutions and authorities on the national scale, while shaping ‘islands of development’ in the territorial dimension. There was a sharp contrast between the highly centralized national scale and the ultimately uneven development of customized institutions. If we invoke an unmodified form of Brenner's meso-level framework, the spatial production of the South Korean developmental state during the 1960s was ‘either logically impossible or empirically improbable’ (see Brenner, 2004: 103–4), as it presented a case of extremely precarious spatial coherence. However, the issue of uneven development was not politicized until southwestern regionalism arose in the late 1960s, despite the fact that not even the concepts of regional and national land planning had been formed. With this in mind, a convincing argument can be made that the spatial production of the hegemonic project complemented morphological defects originating from the state projects and accumulation strategies.

Modernization of the fatherland and economic nationalism as hegemonic projects

The ruling regime of the 1960s exhibited features of a ‘developmental mobilization regime’ (Cho and Jessop, 2001), assimilating economic growth to the national interest. The legitimacy of every state program was supposedly based on the national interest (Kwon, 2006: 170–1). By this account, the development planning of Park's regime during the 1960s was a modernization project that turned the ‘modernization of the fatherland’ discourse into a powerful hegemonic project (Cho, 2010). A survey conducted on experts in 1967 reveals the positions taken by the participants in the industrialization discourse (Hong, 1967: 161–76). This investigation found that industrialization and economic growth were the foremost priorities for modernization as perceived by intellectuals, 29.6% of them citing industrialization and 22.6% increases in living standards. Moreover, 60.7% replied that they would sacrifice their individual freedom in exchange for economic progress. This survey both reveals their thoughts on economic growth and displays their discourses.

Key ideologies of industrialization as the modernization of the fatherland: exportism and the ‘performance first’ ideology

Exportism was settled shortly after a comprehensive export enhancement program was announced in June 1964. In October of the same year, Jung-Hee Park announced that the most important step required for building the foundation for a self-supporting economy was to ‘secure foreign currency by promoting exports’ and that the foremost goal of his economic policy was to ‘prioritize exports above all else’ (see Oh, 2006: 78-9). The nicknames given to the cabinet, such as the ‘assault cabinet’ and ‘export minister’, clearly represented the character of Park's regime (Lee, W.-B., 2006: 190). The results appeared even sooner than expected. In November of the following year, Korea managed to export US $100 million worth of goods, and 5 December was designated the ‘Day of Export’. In early 1965, Jung-Hee Park promoted slogans such as ‘production increase’, ‘export’, and ‘construction’ by means of his State of the Union messages, declaring ‘export or death’ (Kwon, 2006: 151). Thus, exportism could not be separated from the performance of ideology. In a situation where policies were evaluated solely by quantitative criteria, indices (such as export records) were doubtlessly dealt with as the life-or-death ends of state planning. Since economic nationalism was the main source of government legitimacy, announcing quantified performance measures was not merely showmanship but a crucial ‘art of government’. This principle was well depicted in the way Park Jung-Hee managed the state's affairs; he mostly used the quantification method (Oh, 2006: 18).

Using a strict quantification evaluation mode, the modernization project, now identified with industrialization, continued throughout the 1960s, serving as the country's most effective hegemonic project (Cho, 2010) with the aim of ‘becoming rich all together’ (Kwon, 2006: 308). The modernization of the fatherland was thus a declaration that industrialization would benefit everyone, going beyond differences in social class, status and region. In this regard, along with emphasizing a single interest for the whole territory, the discourse shaped a ‘mental space’ (Lefebvre, 2009: 225) on the national scale. The aggregation of data on national performance had the effect of concealing the real economic situation on the regional and urban scales. In the end, cost-benefit analyses were based on the aggregated quantities for the whole country, on the national scale. This was how the coherence of the state space was sustained despite almost every region being excluded from industrialization, the ‘modernization of the fatherland’.

The rise of regionalism as a bottom-up rescaling process

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. Introduction
  4. Theoretical background
  5. Re-examination of state rescaling in the context of developmental state-building
  6. Territorial coalition, competing regionalisms, and conditions for fracturing hegemony
  7. Research context: the hegemonic crisis of the developmental regime
  8. The production of state space and its coherence in the 1960s
  9. The rise of regionalism as a bottom-up rescaling process
  10. Conclusion
  11. References
  12. Supporting Information

Having discussed the spatial production of state projects, it is now time to explore the process of fracturing hegemony, particularly the function of regionalist discourse and region building in this regard. By the late 1960s, the imagined community and economy on the national scale had been challenged and cracked by the regionalism of Honam, a historical name for the region that includes both South and North Jeolla. Territorialized actors who had failed in business because of state spatial selectivity implemented two scalar strategies. The first was the Honam regionalist movement and region building. The movement reconstructed the region as a pre-modern one excluded from the ‘modernization of the fatherland’. The second scalar strategy was ‘scale-jumping’ through a presidential candidate. Through this strategy, the territorial coalition constructed a space of engagement on the national scale and articulated with the movement streams of students, the intelligentsia, and the urban middle class. The regionalist campaigns decisively increased scepticism about the modernization of the fatherland (see Figure 2).

figure

Figure 2. The three phases of the Honam regionalist campaign

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Kicking off the territorial coalition: the first phase without territorial strategies

No sooner had the industrialization policy through the induction of foreign capital been announced than a group of local capitalists based in Gwangju tried to establish an automobile plant and organized a ‘Committee for Asia Motors Co.'s Plant Construction’ on 6 July 1962 (GCCI, 1976: 377). The leader of the committee was Lee Mun-Hwan, a representative of local capitalists with a large overseas network (Gimm, 2009: 260). Lee Mun-Hwan had visited Western Europe and the United States in November 1961 to conduct preliminary negotiations for investment. The next year, he signed an agreement for patent rights and the supply of military vehicles with Willys Co., a US military supplier, and then established Asia Motors Co. in February 1962 (GCCI, 1976: 377). Moreover, he signed an agreement for a three-million-dollar investment with the New York-based Eisenberg Company. The campaign to establish Asia Motors and construct the plant was the first experience that united the territorialized capitalists of Gwangju (Gimm, 2009: 260). This energetic initiative to establish a vehicle plant can be seen as the moment when the territorial interests of the Gwangju city region materialized as a coalition. Yet, although this territorial coalition adopted the strategy of intervening directly in policymaking through personal networks such as Lee Mun-Hwan's overseas connections, plant construction was impossible without the permission of the central government, specifically the EPB, which had full authority over industrial policy, including foreign loans.

The territorial coalition's countermeasures against policy change: the second phase of regionalism (1)

The effort to attract the Asia Motors plant to Gwangju faced a roadblock, but was very likely to be realized with Eisenberg's visit. The US Department of Defense demanded that the facility be built before the company started supplying, whereas the Korean government declared that it would not allow construction until the supply was guaranteed. The GCCI recommended that the central government grant the permit, since the company needed to acquire a loan in the private domain (GCCI, 1976: 378). However, the movement for the establishment of Asia Motors Co. was not warmly welcomed by the central government. The problem was that its automobile unification policy centred on Shinjin Motors (Gimm, 2009: 261). In June 1964, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy prepared a draft plan for the cultivation of the automobile industry that guaranteed the monopoly of Shinjin Motors, which had been established in Busan. At the time, the government's payment guarantee to the outside world was not an option but a necessity when Korean companies with low credit ratings wanted to borrow from the outside. It was thus disastrous for Lee Mun-Hwan and GCCI that the central government had chosen Shinjin as the only automobile company allowed to get a foreign loan.

The series of government policies introduced around the time when there was hope in Gwangju and South Jeolla Province created the turning point for Honam becoming a marginalized region. As newspaper articles claiming that the Shinjin Motors plant would be established in Busan (in the southeast region) continued to be published, Honam's ‘raw deal’ was mentioned repeatedly. This, in turn, led to the formation of the South Jeolla Campaign Committee to Correct the Raw Deal (hereafter SJCCCRD). On 20 August 1966, 60 figures from 12 fields (such as local newspapers, GCCI, labour unions, legal and religious associations, and opposition congressmen) gathered in order to inaugurate the SJCCCRD. On 22 August 1966, the SJCCCRD adopted a resolution with the following three clauses (Kyunghyang Daily, 22 August 1966): (1) to urge the implementation of three promised initiatives of the central government (the Gwangju Industrial Complex, the Yeosu No. 2 oil refinery plant and the Yeongsan River basin development; see Figure S3), (2) to urge the formation of a coalition of National Assembly members from South Jeolla, and (3) to rally all residents of the province to eradicate regional discrimination. Five representatives of the committee travelled to Seoul to deliver this resolution to the Office of the Prime Minister through congressmen from South Jeolla. In conjunction with reactions of the central government, the regionalist campaign was successful in the short run (Gimm, 2009: 269). In December 1966, the foreign loan for Asia Motors was accepted by the central government, which meant the abrogation of the policy for the unification of automobile firms. This achievement had relied on the ‘raw deal’ discourse from South Jeolla Province (Oh, 1996: 112).

Expansion from South Jeolla to Honam: the second phase of regionalism (2)

On 1 February 1968, a historic event, the groundbreaking ceremony for the Gyeong-bu (Seoul–Busan) Expressway, was held (see Figure S4). Construction had begun within 3 months of the news that the expressway task force would launch in November 1967. On 8 December 1967, Congressman Kim Dae-Jung, who would become the main opposition candidate in the 1971 presidential elections, discussed the Gyeong-bu Expressway and the ‘raw deal’ for Honam. He asked: ‘How come investments are focused mostly on the Gyeongsang region, even after the regime has been referred to as the Gyeongsang regime?’ (Secretariat of the National Assembly, 1967: 2). Local newspapers in Gwangju began to mention the ‘raw deal’ once again, starting in January 1968, when the expressway plan materialized, most notably in a series of articles entitled ‘Road of South Jeolla’ in the Jeonnam Daily (January 1968). The biggest problem was the double-tracking of the Honam (Seoul–Mokpo) Line. The promised double-tracking of the Honam (Seoul–Mokpo) railway had been pushed back many times since liberation.8 The Gyeong-bu (Seoul–Busan) Expressway construction plan, announced at a time when the Park regime was accused of being the ‘Gyeongsang Province regime’, was more than enough to incite the territorial coalition. Thus, the Gwangju territorial coalition once again advocated the double-tracking of the Honam Line.

On 20 January 1967, the Committee for Securing Honam's Interests was launched under the leadership of the territorial coalition and soon changed its name to the Honam Region Modernization Committee (HRMC). The HRMC's claims were detailed in a small booklet called Marginalized Honam. The preface argues the following:

It is not unknown that Honam region has been quite marginalized by the development policy compared to other regions and that 7 million Honam residents openly hope to have equal benefits from modernization, longing more desperately to devote all the power we have to develop this backward district in all areas, including transportation, industry and socio-culturally, with a spirit of helpfulness rather than complaint and with an air of promotion rather than dissatisfaction (HRMC, 1968: 7, my translation).

The composition of the HRMC was significant, as it defined Honam as the new boundary. The committee extended the boundary of the ‘marginalized’ region from South Jeolla to Honam. Of course, this was done to demand that linear infrastructure pass through South and North Jeolla (on the Honam railroad line and expressway). Whereas the SJCCCRD had defined South Jeolla as a regional scale, the HRMC sought to extend the territory of the marginalized region (Gimm, 2009) so that it encompassed all of South and North Jeolla provinces.

Region building as a bottom-up rescaling process

As background to the emergence of Honam regionalism, there was an attempt at capital concentration by the local capitalists of Gwangju. When Park Jung-Hee held the reins of government, firms were given an opportunity to grow by acquiring foreign loans. Gwangju's local capitalists took this opportunity. However, without scalar strategies the efforts failed. In the process, however, a strong regional coalition was established by local capitalists, politicians (from Gwangju, South Jeolla and North Jeolla) across the political spectrum and local newspapers, leading to a transition into full-fledged scale politics. The next strategy chosen by the territorial coalition was region building through the discourse of regionalism. Whether intended or not, it was an attack on the spatial production of hegemonic projects which had supported the precarious coherence. It initially focused on the South Jeolla region, but then a regionalist campaign was undertaken to build Honam as a marginalized region.

The regionalist campaigns, which lasted from the first attempt to build South Jeolla region in 1966 and gathered force through the territorial expansion to Honam in 1968, achieved economic outcomes, at least in terms of changes of production value and value-added (see Table 2). The production values and value-addeds of Honam region are also de facto similar to those of other regions such as Gangwon, South and North Chungcheong and Jeju; even North Gyeongsang had the same value-added as South Jeolla in 1971. Furthermore, taking into account the changes between 1967 and 1971, Honam was the only region whose shares in production value and value-added increased apart from Seoul, Gyeonggi and South Gyeongsang, where industrial complexes were established. Minister Chung-Hun Park of the EPB offered a clue to the economic result of Honam regionalism during an argument with opposition congressman Dae-Jung Kim, who problematized the ‘raw deal’ to Honam, on 22 November 1968 as follows: ‘But spending is significant in various categories, which makes for a great deal, not a raw deal for South Jeolla Province according to the statistics of the Health Department’ (Secretariat of the National Assembly, 1968: 30).

Table 2. Regional shares and changes of production value and value-added (1963–71)
 1963196719711963–671967–70
PaVbPVPVPVPV
  1. a

    P = production value

  2. b

    V = value-added

Source: Statistics Korea, Korean Statistical Information System, http://kosis.kr (accessed 3.5.12)
Seoul31.631.728.528.129.631.4−3.1−3.51.13.2
Gyeonggi10.58.910.28.914.813.1−0.40.04.74.3
Gangwon5.78.95.27.83.24.6−0.6−1.1−2.0−3.2
North Chungcheong4.15.14.15.42.52.8−0.10.3−1.6−2.6
South Chungcheong4.74.35.96.65.56.51.22.3−0.4−0.2
Jeju0.50.60.30.30.20.2−0.2−0.3−0.1−0.1
Southwest (Honam)9.911.07.57.810.010.12.43.12.52.2
North Jeolla4.65.73.03.23.43.6−1.7−2.50.40.3
South Jeolla5.25.34.54.66.66.5−0.7−0.72.11.9
Southeast32.929.538.435.034.231.45.55.64.23.6
North Gyeongsang12.512.410.710.37.26.5−1.8−2.2−3.5−3.8
South Gyeongsang3.53.48.210.111.312.14.76.63.12.0
Busan16.913.719.514.715.712.92.61.1−3.8−1.8

However, in 1970, In-Cheon Park, the chairman of the GCIC, attempted to nationalize the issue. He visited journalists, especially from South and North Jeolla provinces, working for major national newspapers to ask for reports on the marginalization of Honam. Not long after that, two major newspapers, the Dong-A Daily and the Chosun Daily, posted editorials and news items about Honam. On 27 August 1970, the Dong-A Daily posted the article ‘To settle Honam Marginalization,’ and, on September 4, the Chosun Daily posted the long editorial ‘Basic Insight into National Land Development’.

During the process of region building, Honam's physical boundary had fluctuated according to political and economic interests. Politicians, local newspapers, local capitalists and social organizations in Gwangju all talked about the ‘raw deal’ and the modernization of Honam, but they were agents territorialized mainly in South Jeolla, particularly in Gwangju. Eventually, a regionalist discourse began with local Gwangju agents, went through South Jeolla province, constructed Honam as a ‘land marginalized from modernization’ and ultimately damaged the coherence of state space and the hegemony of the ‘modernization of the fatherland’. In sum, the state spatial process of the 1960s did not build a regional scale but merely produced islands of development on the local scale in accordance with decision-making on the national scale. It was, rather, the bottom-up regionalism led by local capitalists that had built the regional scale in response to state spatial production during this period. The local actors resorted to regionalism to maximize opportunities and seek the state-created rents given by the state-led development strategies.

Fracturing hegemony and top-down rescaling: multi-scalar agent and space of engagement

In the 1971 election, Dae-Jung Kim, the main opposition candidate, got huge support from the public. He blasted the development strategy of the ruling regime: ‘We have lived through ‘the dark despotic era’ in the 1950s and ‘a period of military dictatorship in the 1960s. Now the 1970s is the time to realize the hopeful people's country’ (Chosun Daily, 17 October 1970). He presented ‘mass-participatory economics’ and ‘mass-participatory democracy’ as a pair and promised to reform the structure of uneven development created by the previous decade's developmental regime.

Kim's argument was thoroughly detailed in an article in the January issue of Sasanggye in 1970, entitled ‘The Vision of the 1970s: Fulfilment of Mass Participatory Democracy’. In it, he denounced the elitist modus operandi and the monopolization of wealth by a few privileged jaebols, while describing the people as the leading agents of change.

He concretized a democracy model for decentralization and balanced growth, and problematized almost every strategy and project of Park's regime that had been sustained during the decade (see Table 3). The hostility that emerged in urban areas toward Park's attempts to hold on to power for the long term could be easily mobilized through Kim's political resources (see Kim, 2004 : 124–5). Honam regionalism could also be articulated through a ‘mass economy theory’ in a discursive manner because the theory, which aimed for devolution and balanced development, had a closer discursive affinity with Honam regionalism. Moreover, as a multi-scalar agent, Dae-Jung Kim had been an active leader of the regionalist campaign.

Table 3. State projects and accumulation strategies of the mass participatory democracy and the mass economy theory
State Projects/StrategiesMajor Policy Programs
Sources: Kim, D.-J. (1989: 163–371); Rhyu (2010: 136), selected by author
Political projects
  • Mass participatory democracy instead of Park's nationalist democracy
  • An immediate implementation of local autonomy (devolution)
Governmental projects
  • Promoting agricultural industry by abolishing the low-priced grain policy
  • Systematic planning for land development (balanced social overhead cost investment)
  • Operation of a labour–capital joint commission and a reduction of government intervention in labour–capital relations
Accumulation strategies
  • Encouragement of balanced industrialization among industries and regions
  • Growth of small and medium-sized national capital through the mixed economy

Top-down rescaling as response to bottom-up rescaling

Jung-Hee Park countered that the existing route and strategy should be retained and strengthened (Chosun Daily, 18 March 1971) and stressed deepening the strategy of modernization of the fatherland. On 17 October 1972, Park declared martial law, dissolved the National Assembly, and announced that the Emergency State Council of Cabinet would act with the Assembly's authority. Ten days later Park promulgated the comprehensive reform known as the ‘Yushin’ (restoration), inspired by the Japanese Meiji Restoration, with the slogan ‘Bu-Guk-Gang-Byoung’, which means a wealthy country and a powerful army (Kim, 2004: 139).

However, two momentous changes were observed: the First Comprehensive National Land Development Plan (1972–81) and the ‘Saemaul Undong’ (New Village Movement for rural areas). While the developmental regime of the 1960s had only produced several industrial places like islands of development, the Yushin regime began to recognize its territory as the object to be mobilized and integrated into developmentalist modernization. In particular, regional scales emerged as the de facto foci of state planning in general. The land development plan divided the entire territory into four regions, and the four regions were subsequently subdivided into eight intermediate development regions. Meanwhile, the government publicized the Saemaul movement as a ‘rural revitalization movement’ or a ‘rural modernization movement’ (Ministry of Home Affairs, 1980: 668–70). These two had played not merely the role of a governmental project to functionally reorganize state space in both the scalar and territorial dimensions but also, especially in the case of the Saemaul movement, the role of a hegemonic project in complementing the vulnerability of state space produced during the 1960s. Consequently, the Yushin regime sought to restore spatial coherence through top-down regionalism and region building as a response to the bottom-up regionalism of Honam.

Conclusion

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. Introduction
  4. Theoretical background
  5. Re-examination of state rescaling in the context of developmental state-building
  6. Territorial coalition, competing regionalisms, and conditions for fracturing hegemony
  7. Research context: the hegemonic crisis of the developmental regime
  8. The production of state space and its coherence in the 1960s
  9. The rise of regionalism as a bottom-up rescaling process
  10. Conclusion
  11. References
  12. Supporting Information

This article has attempted to examine the interaction between the top-down and bottom-up rescaling processes, as follows. First, I critically reviewed the existing literature on state rescaling in the context of the developmental state, specifically to suggest revisions to it in the context of the developmental era of South Korea. I then proposed two concepts in a more general sense, namely, spatial coherence to provide a hypothetical interpretation and the multi-scalar agent who facilitates articulation among different factions in the strategic relation of the nation-state. Second, I addressed the coherence among spatial selectivities that were produced through state projects (political and governmental projects) and state strategies (capital accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects) during the 1960s. By this analysis, I proposed a possible interpretation of coherence with respect to its shortcomings and vulnerability to politics of scale like regionalist politics. The third part showed the range of strategies available to territorial coalitions in particular, highlighting the roles of the multi-scalar agent. I was able to formulate, through the case study, a possible path through which the form of coalition and its strategies evolved corresponding to the morphological change of state space. At the end of the case study, the space of engagement opened up by the presidential election in 1971 was discussed. By highlighting the roles of Dae-Jung Kim, the main opposition candidate, as a multi-scalar agent, I elucidated how regionalism engaged in the political space on the national scale and contributed to fracturing the hegemony.

Specifically, the rescaling process in South Korea during the 1960s could provide a possible reference for future studies on cases that show features of ‘contemporaneous non-contemporaneity’ (Bloch, 1991: 97–116) in the spatial sense, ranging from the Industrial Revolution era in Germany to more recently developing countries including China. Two features should be highlighted here: (1) capitalist accumulation strategies as governmental projects in state-led industrialization, and vice versa; (2) the significance of spatial production through hegemonic projects, which enabled people to consider the whole territory as a homogenous single unit of economic growth. In a more general vein, I have offered two concepts: spatial coherence to assess the vulnerability of state space produced by state processes, and the multi-scalar agent as a condition under which the regionalist faction and its regionalism as a strategy could successfully be engaged with other factions and their strategies in the political space on the national scale. In addition, a simple suggestion for an improvement in methodology has been made; I sought to examine the rents that were produced by state intervention in the financial market as a criterion to figure out the scalar division of labour.

The article concludes by mentioning some of the further problems raised by this case study. Above all, it seems necessary to examine various spatio-temporal matrices of developmental eras by countries, which could contribute to the literature on state rescaling as well as the studies on developmental states. Furthermore, if the country has already passed the phase of rapid growth, we can focus on the articulation of the layer of the developmental era and the newly organized layer produced by globalization or neoliberal drive. Where a country is now going through a period of developmentalist transformation under conditions of globalization, or neoliberalism, significant comparative studies may be carried out.

Footnotes
  1. 1

    To use Bhaskar's (2008) terminology, ‘the actual’ refers to events that actually happen, whether experienced or not. It is generated by ‘the real’, which refers to structures and mechanisms.

  2. 2

    The structural coupling between an ‘economic nucleus’ and its ‘mode of social regulation’ underpins the theoretical construction of the state form as separate from society (Jessop, 1990: 6) and represents ‘structural moments’ of state spatiality to adduce ‘state spatial form’ (Brenner, 2004: 91). This concept was originally linked to an interlocked history of structural congruence between the trajectories of two systems (Maturana and Varela, 1987: 75) and in this sense may refer to the continuity of historical time. The opposite can be observed in the ‘strategic coordination’ and ‘strategic moments’ concepts (Jessop, 1990: 359; Brenner, 2004: 91). These point to the ‘strategic dimension of co-evolution considered from the viewpoint of specific social forces or agencies’ (Jessop, 1990: 359). This coordination is the field of capital accumulation strategies, state projects and hegemonic projects (ibid.: 360). The concept of strategic coordination can thus be linked to the discontinuity due to strategic interventions.

  3. 3

    According to Brenner (2004: 88), state projects are ‘initiatives to endow state institutions with organizational coherence, functional coordination, and operational unity’, and state strategies are initiatives to mobilize state institutions in order to ‘regulate the circuit of capital’ (Jessop's accumulation strategies) and to ‘modify the balance of forces within civil society’ (Jessop's hegemonic projects).

  4. 4

    Keating (1997) distinguishes between top-down regionalism as state policy and bottom-up regionalism as the process of making political demands such as cultural issues, questions of autonomy, social priorities and differences in economic emphases.

  5. 5

    Figures labelled S1, S2, etc. are to be found in the Supporting Information accompanying the online version of this article. A list of such figures is given at the end of the article.

  6. 6

    Statistics Korea, Korean Statistical Information System, http://kosis.kr (accessed 20 May 2012).

  7. 7

    According to Akyüz and Gore (1996: 466–8), state-created rents were crucial to the capital accumulation process, establishing new industries in East Asian developmental states and boosting profits and promoting investment (see also Chang, 1994).

  8. 8

    The double-track construction of the Gyeong-bu railway was begun in 1940 and finished in 1944. Construction work on the Honam railway, by contrast, started from Daejeon only in 1978, and the entire line was not completed until 1988 (see Figure 4S).

References

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. Introduction
  4. Theoretical background
  5. Re-examination of state rescaling in the context of developmental state-building
  6. Territorial coalition, competing regionalisms, and conditions for fracturing hegemony
  7. Research context: the hegemonic crisis of the developmental regime
  8. The production of state space and its coherence in the 1960s
  9. The rise of regionalism as a bottom-up rescaling process
  10. Conclusion
  11. References
  12. Supporting Information
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Supporting Information

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. Introduction
  4. Theoretical background
  5. Re-examination of state rescaling in the context of developmental state-building
  6. Territorial coalition, competing regionalisms, and conditions for fracturing hegemony
  7. Research context: the hegemonic crisis of the developmental regime
  8. The production of state space and its coherence in the 1960s
  9. The rise of regionalism as a bottom-up rescaling process
  10. Conclusion
  11. References
  12. Supporting Information
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ijur12002-sup-0001-si.doc638K

Figure S1 The change in gross domestic product and gross fixed capital formation (Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System, http://ecos.bok.or.kr, accessed 6.1.13.)

Figure S2 The change in industrial structure (source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System, http://ecos.bok.or.kr, accessed 6.1.13)

Figure S3 Yeosu and the Yeongsan River

Figure S4 Railway and expressway connections

Table S1 Regional distribution of the entrepreneurs of large companies during the 1960s

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