Sowing the Seeds of Conflict: The Effect of Dispute Settlements on Durations of Peace

We apply formal models of deterrence developed by Zagare and Kilgour (2000) to examine the impact of dispute settlements on future discord. Our theory of recurrent conflict, based primarily on how levels of satisfaction lead to different types of deterrence, allows us to formulate explicit expectations for the relative stability of militarized conflict settlements. We conceptualize peace periods following dispute settlements as situations of mutual or unilateral deterrence, depending on the method of resolution applied to the preceding dispute. Relations following imposed settlements are modeled as unilateral deterrence situations, while affairs subsequent to negotiated settlements and disputes ending without a settlement are viewed as instances of mutual deterrence. We derive hypotheses regarding durations of peace and test them through survival analyses of the periods of peace following 2,536 dyadic militarized interstate disputes between 1816 and 1992. Our results strongly support the theory's expectations, with disputes characterized by an imposed settlement being followed by significantly longer durations of peace than disputes followed by either a negotiated settlement or no settlement at all.