Favorable Selection, Risk Adjustment, and the Medicare Advantage Program

Authors

  • Michael A. Morrisey,

    Corresponding author
    1. Department of Health Care Organization and Policy, the Lister Hill Center for Health Policy, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL
    2. Center for Outcomes and Effectiveness Research & Education, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL
    • Lister Hill Center for Health Policy, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL
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  • Meredith L. Kilgore,

    1. Department of Health Care Organization and Policy, the Lister Hill Center for Health Policy, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL
    2. Center for Outcomes and Effectiveness Research & Education, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL
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  • David J. Becker,

    1. Department of Health Care Organization and Policy, the Lister Hill Center for Health Policy, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL
    2. Center for Outcomes and Effectiveness Research & Education, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL
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  • Wilson Smith,

    1. Department of Epidemiology, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL
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  • Elizabeth Delzell

    1. Center for Outcomes and Effectiveness Research & Education, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL
    2. Department of Epidemiology, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL
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Address correspondence to Michael A. Morrisey, Ph.D., Lister Hill Center for Health Policy, University of Alabama at Birmingham, 1665 University Blvd, Birmingham, AL 35294-0022; e-mail: morrisey@uab.edu.

Abstract

Objectives

To examine the effects of changes in payment and risk adjustment on (1) the annual enrollment and switching behavior of Medicare Advantage (MA) beneficiaries, and (2) the relative costliness of MA enrollees and disenrollees.

Data

From 1999 through 2008 national Medicare claims data from the 5 percent longitudinal sample of Parts A and B expenditures.

Study Design

Retrospective, fixed effects regression analysis of July enrollment and year-long switching into and out of MA. Similar regression analysis of the costliness of those switching into (out of) MA in the 6 months prior to enrollment (after disenrollment) relative to nonswitchers in the same county over the same period.

Findings

Payment generosity and more sophisticated risk adjustment were associated with substantial increases in MA enrollment and decreases in disenrollment. Claims experience of those newly switching into MA was not affected by any of the policy reforms, but disenrollment became increasingly concentrated among high-cost beneficiaries.

Conclusions

Enrollment is very sensitive to payment levels. The use of more sophisticated risk adjustment did not alter favorable selection into MA, but it did affect the costliness of disenrollees.

Ancillary