Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds
Article first published online: 21 MAR 2003
DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00545
Additional Information
How to Cite
Elton, E. J., Gruber, M. J. and Blake, C. R. (2003), Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds. The Journal of Finance, 58: 779–804. doi: 10.1111/1540-6261.00545
Publication History
- Issue published online: 21 MAR 2003
- Article first published online: 21 MAR 2003
- Abstract
- References
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This paper examines the effect of incentive fees on the behavior of mutual fund managers. Funds with incentive fees exhibit positive stock selection ability, but a beta less than one results in funds not earning positive fees. From an investor's perspective, positive alphas plus lower expense ratios make incentive-fee funds attractive. However, incentive-fee funds take on more risk than non-incentive-fee funds, and they increase risk after a period of poor performance. Incentive fees are useful marketing tools, since more new cash flows go into incentive-fee funds than into non-incentive-fee funds, ceteris paribus.

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