We are grateful to Ralph Bailey, Talat Genc, William Hogan, Ali Hortacsu, Erik Lundin, anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (May, 2010) for comments. Holmberg has been financially supported by The Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation and the Research Program “The Economics of Electricity Markets.” Anderson and Philpott acknowledge the financial support of the New Zealand Marsden Fund under contract no. UOA719WIP.
Mixed strategies in discriminatory divisible-good auctions
Version of Record online: 5 APR 2013
Copyright © 2013, RAND.
The RAND Journal of Economics
Volume 44, Issue 1, pages 1–32, Spring 2013
How to Cite
Anderson, E. J., Holmberg, P. and Philpott, A. B. (2013), Mixed strategies in discriminatory divisible-good auctions. The RAND Journal of Economics, 44: 1–32. doi: 10.1111/1756-2171.12008
- Issue online: 5 APR 2013
- Version of Record online: 5 APR 2013
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