We are grateful to John Wooders for his helpful comments and suggestions, which significantly improved this work. We thank Tatsuhiro Shichijo, Takehiko Yamato, and the seminar participants at the fifth Spain, Italy, Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory (SING 5; held in July 2009 at VU University Amsterdam), the 2009 Far East and South Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society (held in August 2009 at Tokyo University), and the 2011 Asia-Pacific ESA Conference (held in February 2011 at the University of Nottingham, Malaysia Campus) for their helpful comments and discussion. Also, we thank Haruki Kumatani for excellent research assistance. This experiment was supported by the Grant-in-Aid for the Global COE “Political Economy of Institutional Construction” from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) of Japan.
Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of keyword auction mechanisms
Article first published online: 10 DEC 2013
© 2013, RAND.
The RAND Journal of Economics
Volume 44, Issue 3, pages 438–461, Fall 2013
How to Cite
Fukuda, E., Kamijo, Y., Takeuchi, A., Masui, M. and Funaki, Y. (2013), Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of keyword auction mechanisms. The RAND Journal of Economics, 44: 438–461. doi: 10.1111/1756-2171.12026
- Issue published online: 10 DEC 2013
- Article first published online: 10 DEC 2013
- Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) of Japan
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