Accepted by Wim Van der Stede. We would like to thank two anonymous referees and our editor. We also want to thank Ashiq Ali, Daniel Cohen, Huasheng Gao, Stephen Hillegeist, Kose John, Shane Johnson, Dave Mauer, Volkan Muslu, Lin Peng, Laura Starks, Justin Wolfers, Yexiao Xu, Harold Zhang, and seminar participants at Bentley University, CKGSB, the University of Texas at Dallas, Tulane University, Harvard Business School, CICF, NUS Corporate Finance Conference, NBER Summer Institute on Law and Economics, and FEA Conference for helpful comments. Research support from the Division of Faculty Research at Harvard Business School is gratefully acknowledged.
Executive Pay–Performance Sensitivity and Litigation†
Article first published online: 7 OCT 2013
Contemporary Accounting Research
Volume 31, Issue 1, pages 152–177, Spring 2014
How to Cite
Dai, Z., Jin, L. and Zhang, W. (2014), Executive Pay–Performance Sensitivity and Litigation. Contemporary Accounting Research, 31: 152–177. doi: 10.1111/1911-3846.12019
- Issue published online: 19 MAR 2014
- Article first published online: 7 OCT 2013
- Accepted manuscript online: 29 NOV 2012 10:35AM EST
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