Erratum

Errata

This article corrects:


    The editor regrets that in volume 71: 4 which consists of a book edited by Mr. K. Lord, an error occurred on page 716, leading to redundant wording and citation in the second and third paragraphs on that page. The corrected paragraphs are as follows:

    The idea that knowledge arises from human nature takes up the distinctions embedded in “ordinary perceptions” and “common speech.” One immediately thinks of John Locke (1997: 468) in this context; for him “coexistence” is one of necessary relation. George appears to use the term initially as simply an underlying continuity or substratum. Later he sees it in the more Lockean sense of necessity or invariability (George 1981: 55). Succession and sequence deal with change, while coexistence represents the permanent. Lockean epistemology is based simply on “the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas” (Locke 1997: 467). George thus appears to frame himself with the commonsense philosophers, but as we shall see, this categorization is itself too simplistic.

    George's principal focus is on the nature of relations in observed phenomena. He notes that there are relations of coexistence and those of succession or sequence. Relations of sequence are merely temporal. They are successive juxtapositions and contingent positionings, but reveal no causal connection. George (1981: 45) then identifies another form of succession, that of consequence. This is a necessary relation of cause and effect. These sorts of relations are irreversible and invariable. For George, espying causal relations is the essence of human reason and the basis of what we call “science.”

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