I am grateful to Riccardo Colacito, Daniel Diermeier, James Druckman, Jon Eguia, Guillaume Frechette, Catherine Hafer, Dimitri Landa, Arthur Lupia, Antonio Merlo, Norman Schofield, David Stasavage, Joshua Tucker, Milada Vachudova, the editor Rick K. Wilson, and four anonymous reviewers for their useful comments. I am particularly grateful for the constant support and advice of Michael Laver and Rebecca Morton. I would also like to thank participants of the workshop on Distributive Politics at UCSD and of the Political Institutions and Public Choice seminar at Duke, and conference participants at MPSA 2007 and APSA 2008. A special thanks to James Druckman and Paul Warwick, who graciously provided the data. Replication files for this article are available in the Dataverse Network at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu, and an online appendix is posted on the AJPS website. All errors remain my own responsibility. Please send questions and comments to firstname.lastname@example.org.
A Model of Endogenous Government Formation
Article first published online: 2 MAY 2013
©2013, Midwest Political Science Association
American Journal of Political Science
Volume 57, Issue 4, pages 777–793, October 2013
How to Cite
Bassi, A. (2013), A Model of Endogenous Government Formation. American Journal of Political Science, 57: 777–793. doi: 10.1111/ajps.12031
- Issue published online: 8 OCT 2013
- Article first published online: 2 MAY 2013
Political parties bargain over the allocation of cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governments. Noncooperative theories of legislative bargaining typically predict that the “formateur” enjoys a disproportionate share of government ministry positions. However, empirical evidence indicates that parties receive shares of portfolios proportional to their share of legislative seats that a government party contributes to the government coalition in support of Gamson's Law of portfolio allocation. This article examines government formation as a process in which both the government coalition and the formateur are determined endogenously. In equilibrium, if parties have similar preferences over cabinet portfolios, the share of seats they are allocated is proportional to the parties’ sizes.