• corporate control;
  • firm performance;
  • investment;
  • ownership structure;
  • private benefits of control;
  • soft budget constraints;
  • transition
  • D04;
  • D21;
  • D22;
  • D43;
  • D92;
  • G32;
  • L22;
  • P34


We analyse the impact of ownership and corporate control on firms’ investment using the 2001 survey of Yacoub et al. on Ukrainian firms. The model explains investment by output, financial and soft budget constraints, and corporate control (and ownership) categories potentially enjoying private benefits of control. We find that the corporate control model fits better than the ownership model, a negative relationship between state and employee control and firms’ investment, and evidence for the presence of soft budget constraints. A negative relationship between firms’ investment and the relative size of non-monetary transactions strengthens the conclusion of private benefits of control impacting investment.