The authors contributed equally to the article.
The Probabilities of Conditionals Revisited
Article first published online: 31 JAN 2013
Copyright © 2013 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.
Volume 37, Issue 4, pages 711–730, May/June 2013
How to Cite
Douven, I. and Verbrugge, S. (2013), The Probabilities of Conditionals Revisited. Cognitive Science, 37: 711–730. doi: 10.1111/cogs.12025
- Issue published online: 8 MAY 2013
- Article first published online: 31 JAN 2013
- Manuscript Accepted: 19 JUL 2012
- Manuscript Revised: 11 JUL 2012
- Manuscript Received: 27 APR 2012
- Triviality arguments;
According to what is now commonly referred to as “the Equation” in the literature on indicative conditionals, the probability of any indicative conditional equals the probability of its consequent of the conditional given the antecedent of the conditional. Philosophers widely agree in their assessment that the triviality arguments of Lewis and others have conclusively shown the Equation to be tenable only at the expense of the view that indicative conditionals express propositions. This study challenges the correctness of that assessment by presenting data that cast doubt on an assumption underlying all triviality arguments.