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At its most basic, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is represented in the firm's choices of how it will operate within the social, political, legal, and ethical standards of the environments in which it finds itself, as well as choices about where it will and will not operate. As such, a firm's CSR strategy is unlikely to be independent, or even separable, from its basic value propositions to its customers, workers, suppliers, shareholders, or other key stakeholders: groups which are themselves embedded wholly or partially within their own societies (Freeman, 1984). This implies that one cannot understand the CSR strategy and politics of organizations without understanding the nature of the institutional environments in which they choose – or are forced – to operate. Equally, CSR strategies and policies represent critical aspects of the choices that the firm – or more correctly its shareholders and managers – makes about how it wants to be governed. This includes who the firm and its managers and owners believe has legitimate claims on the residual rents as well as which stakeholders deserve to have a legally recognized voice in corporate decisions. Thus, at both a macro and micro level, the interaction of corporate governance (CG) and corporate responsibility is a topic the editors felt worthy of further exploration.

Although the topic of CSR can be traced back to the earliest work on the origin of the firm (Montes, 2003) and its modern operationalization being initially laid out in work such as Berle (1931) and Dodd (1932), academic interest in the topic has been decidedly Western in its orientation and narrow in the conceptualization of what “social responsibility” means when taken in a more international and global context that goes beyond post-Westphalian nation states (Devinney, 2011). In addition, over time, work on the topic has bifurcated away from the link between CSR and the governance structure of the corporation, with some scholars – in areas such as law, finance, accounting, and economics – continuing to concentrate on the formal legal governance and regulatory requirements and how they relate to CSR, while scholars in management, sociology, business ethics, and development are more concerned with the link between CSR and managerial incentives and behaviors. In formulating this special issue of Corporate Governance: An International Review, our goal was to bridge this divide in two ways: first, to concentrate on work that had more of an international comparative flavor in the sense that what was being brought into the discussion was the role of different institutional environments and cultures; and second, to emphasize work that linked governance and CSR endogenously; where neither CSR nor CG was viewed as a static and independent phenomenon. In doing so, we were not attempting to provide a definitive statement as to the relationship between CG and CSR, but to set the stage for a research program that incorporated the two as representing parts of the larger question of who has a right to governance claims in the corporation and what the implications of those claims might be.

Corporate Governance Systems and CSR

  1. Top of page
  2. Corporate Governance Systems and CSR
  3. The Interaction Between CG and CSR Within the Firm
  4. Future Directions in CSR-CG Research
  5. References

At a macro level, whether the corporate governance system generally is oriented towards shareholders alone, or towards a broader stakeholder group, will have implications for firms’ relationships with societal institutions and sense of social obligations (De Graaf & Stoelhorst, 2013; Gill, 2008; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012). In a shareholder-focused corporate governance system, directors’ and managers’ fiduciary obligations run to the company and its shareholders only, as in the United States (Bainbridge, 2003; Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001), Australia (Hill, 2005), and the United Kingdom (Williams & Conley, 2005). In contrast, stakeholder systems of corporate governance, such as in Continental Europe, Japan (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003), or India (Cappelli, Singh, Singh, & Useem, 2010), require a more comprehensive perspective on whose well-being matters and, therefore, how to manage the firm (Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984). Board members and managers may clearly consider multiple constituents when making decisions, so acting to promote the well-being of society is consistent with the dictates of good corporate governance in these countries. However, for multinational corporations which operate over many, at times conflicting, societies, this issue becomes much more complex (Devinney, 2011). Even in the case of narrow social considerations, it may be that this sharp distinction is blurring, at least as regards fiduciary obligations as articulated in law. In a number of countries with a greater shareholder orientation to corporate governance the failure to consider other constituents is seen to now pose potentially significant legal risk.

For example, in Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court rejected the shareholder orientation in favor of a stakeholder perspective in Peoples’ Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise,1 later reaffirmed by that Court's invocation to companies in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debenture Holders2 of their legal obligations to act as a “good corporate citizen.” In the United Kingdom, Parliament enacted comprehensive reform of company law in 2006 that includes a statutory formulation of fiduciary duties in Section 172.3 That section arguably implements an “enlightened shareholder” corporate governance regime under which directors are required to take account of a broad range of stakeholders while acting in the interests of a company's long-term shareholders (Williams & Conley, 2007).

It is also the case that in the United States there can be legal risks from a failure to consider broader interests, specifically international human rights obligations. This risk comes from the strong international consensus that such obligations are part of a company's responsibilities, instantiated in the United Nations Human Rights Council's approval of the Ruggie “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” framework identifying countries’ and companies’ human rights obligations;4 construed together with the holding under company law in Delaware, the predominant state for company incorporations, that directors’ fiduciary duty of loyalty includes attending to the existence of law compliance systems,5 which could well include the international human rights law compliance obligations identified in the Ruggie process. Notwithstanding these legal developments, though, company directors in Anglo-American companies still predominantly understand their fiduciary obligations to be to the shareholders, with pressures from the capital markets and private equity shareholders underscoring that orientation.

A second macro-orientation that affects CSR is how countries address social welfare provision. In countries like the United States with more limited protections for labor, as compared to Europe, or without socialized medicine, companies may be under pressure from various constituents to enact protective corporate responsibility programs to address social problems that can affect the productivity of a company's workforce (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Granapathi, 2007). Matten and Moon (2008) have called such an orientation “explicit” CSR, since companies communicate explicitly about what they are volunteering to do to address social problems in such countries. In contrast, in countries with a social democratic past (such as the UK) (Roe, 2000) or present (such as Continental Europe), legislation requires more protection of labor and provision of social welfare benefits, so companies do not need to volunteer to address these underlying social and economic concerns. Rather, “the entirety of a country's formal and informal institutions assign corporations an agreed share of responsibility for society's interests” (Matten & Moon, 2008:404). This “implicit CSR” orientation enables companies to act in the interest of employees, customers, suppliers, and communities “merely” by following the law and acting consistently with social norms (Matten & Moon, 2008). Yet, scholarship using institutional theory puts pressure on the notion of “voluntary” CSR, even within Anglo-American corporate governance regimes. Thus, “institutional theory suggests seeking to place CSR explicitly within a wider field of economic governance characterized by different modes, including the market, state regulation and beyond” (Brammer, Jackson, & Matten, 2012:7). As so conceived, CSR is among a range of institutions with governance implications for the corporation and the economy (Brammer et al., 2012:20). CSR as a governance mechanism is an example of transnational “new governance” regimes that have been proliferating as sources of business regulation (Blair, Williams, & Lin, 2008; Cashore, 2002; Meidinger, 2006), operating to bring social and environmental standards into some aspects of business practice.

It is to this strand of institutional theory that Jonathan Raelin and Krista Bondy can be understood to contribute in their ambitious article “Putting the Good Back in Good Corporate Governance: The Presence and Problems of Double-Layered Agency Theory.” This article challenges traditional agency theory as currently understood by exploring what the authors call a second layer of agency theory, that between shareholders and society. Thus, the authors assert that given the implicit “association between value maximization and societal benefit,” shareholders have a role to act as agents for society's best interests. The authors find evidence for this second layer of agency implicit in three aspects of the agency theory literature: notions about the importance of “(1) [the] firm's effective use of societal resources, (2) society's ability to control its resources, and (3) [the] shared desire [of shareholders and society] to limit managerialism” (Raelin & Bondy, 2013:420). Making an argument about shareholders as societal agents, the authors “explicitly connect shareholders to society through a principal–agent relationship, conferring duties on shareholders to protect society in the course of ensuring profit maximization of firms” (Raelin & Bondy, 2013:420). And yet this second layer of agency issues has its own difficulties, particularly the difficulties in “(1) society monitoring its agents and (2) measuring actions that benefit society.” They conclude with two structural solutions to represent societies’ interests in the firm and help solve the measurement issues. These are independent oversight boards to formalize the representation of society, and requirements that the social purpose of the firm be memorialized in its founding documents, much as is now required in the US in the new organizational form some states are permitting, the Public Benefit Corporation.

Raelin and Bondy respond directly to the call from Brammer, Jackson, and Matten to “re-think the private/public boundary,” both in scholarship and practice, recognizing that an institutional view of CSR suggests that it can operate by “bringing the public interest back into the private domain of the corporation (Brammer et al., 2012:20). By providing both structural and theoretical arguments, they have suggested both why and how to combine corporate governance arrangements shaped by agency theory with a broader conception of social interests that companies must consider, particularly in today's context of increasing resource constraints, necessitating ever more careful stewardship of society's resources.

The other conceptual paper in this Special Issue, “(Re-)Interpreting Fiduciary Duty to Justify Socially Responsible Investment for Pension Funds?” by Joakim Sandberg looks at a related concept, and controversy, over shareholders as purported agents for societal interests, asking whether the fiduciary duties of pension fund trustees can be reinterpreted to require socially responsible investment (SRI). Evaluating the fiduciary duties of pension fund trustees begins from a pragmatic perspective: according to a recent OECD report, “the pension funds of Western countries hold assets equivalent to (on average) 76 percent of the GDP of their respective countries” (Sandberg 2013:436). Given the size of global pension fund assets (estimated at $24 trillion in 2009), the negative potential of pension funds to exacerbate market instabilities by their “herding” behavior has been recognized (Financial Services Authority, 2009; Johnson & de Graaf, 2011). Moreover, the positive potential to advance environmental, social, and governance (ESG) aspects of company practices by pension funds including ESG factors in their investment approaches has led to vigorous debate within the pension fund and SRI communities about the extent to which pension fund trustees’ fiduciary duties can be (or need be) re-conceptualized to permit SRI, including debate and initiatives at the United Nations (its Principles for Responsible Investment). Approaching the issue as “a theoretical issue of how far the concept of fiduciary can be ‘stretched’ to accommodate SRI,” Sandberg evaluates the arguments for expanded fiduciary duties and finds them lacking as a matter of philosophical and economic theory. To the extent that important political or social interests would be advanced by pension funds taking better account of ESG factors, he argues that there must be independent statutory obligations put on the pension funds – independent of arguments over beneficiaries’ interests, which form the core of trustees’ fiduciary duties. Such an independent obligation has been enacted in some countries, such as Sweden, France, New Zealand, and Norway (Sandberg, 2013:436).

Sandberg's article responds to an energetic debate over pension funds’ fiduciary duties, a debate occurring both in practice and in theory. By carefully evaluating the arguments for expanded fiduciary duties, and pointing out their shortcomings, he calls upon advocates for expanded fiduciary duties to articulate with greater clarity and force the rationales for putting obligations on trustees to act as stewards for society's welfare, and not just the welfare, construed in purely economic terms, of a fund's beneficiaries. In so doing, Sandberg (implicitly) challenges Raelin and Bondy's view that shareholders can be understood to have obligations as agents of general social welfare. Both articles address a fundamental question in shareholder-oriented corporate governance systems, though: If companies are managed to maximize shareholder wealth, what responsibilities do the shareholders have, or should the shareholders have, for the social effects of that management focus?

The Interaction Between CG and CSR Within the Firm

  1. Top of page
  2. Corporate Governance Systems and CSR
  3. The Interaction Between CG and CSR Within the Firm
  4. Future Directions in CSR-CG Research
  5. References

The three empirical papers in this Special Issue each respond to a different challenge: to be more explicit about how CSR is being defined while it is being investigated. Unsurprisingly, these three papers each do well something both William Judge, the Editor of CGIR when this Special Issue was being developed, and Timothy Devinney, the guest Associate Editor, called for in their prior work: provide clear definitions of what aspect of CSR is being investigated (Devinney, 2009), and better theoretical justification for the dependent variables being used in the investigation (Judge, 2008). Treating CSR as the independent variable, Devinney has argued that there needs to be much better specification of what is being studied and what organizational pathways are (in theory) being activated to lead to the (again, in theory) better financial performance that he takes as axiomatically interesting as the dependent variable of any firm strategy (Devinney, 2009). Regarding the dependent variable, Judge has recognized that corporate governance research generally has used a wide range of dependent variables (Judge, 2008). In the one issue of CGIR in which he made that observation, there were seven corporate governance articles with seven different dependent variables: composition of boards of directors; nationality of board members; issuance of audit opinions; voluntary disclosure of information; cash holdings; CSR; and firm performance. While each of these variables could be worth studying, Judge called for corporate governance scholars to think more carefully about why the variables being studied matter. As he put the point “some might even argue that the key dependent variable of interest involves national outcomes, such as national productivity, distributional equity in wealth, environmental sustainability, and even level of human development. In sum, corporate governance scholars are still trying to clarify what the specific dependent variable (or variables) should be” (Judge, 2008:ii). While the three empirical papers in this Special Issue do not answer Judge's more general challenge to corporate governance research, each of them is clear about what is being studied within the broad ambit of topics that can be considered CSR, and is clear about why the research matters.

The article by Bo Bae Choi, Doowon Lee, and Youngkyu Park, “Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance and Earnings Quality: Evidence from Korea,” evaluates earnings quality within Korean firms to distinguish between two hypotheses that had been generated by prior research: that socially responsible firms had better financial reporting (higher earnings quality) to foster long-term relationships with important stakeholders (the long-term hypothesis), versus the theory that managers may use CSR strategically to deflect attention from their own opportunistic behavior, including their opportunistic use of more aggressive financial manipulation and so lower earnings quality; e.g., the managerial opportunism hypothesis. Choi et al. defined CSR narrowly, to reflect the Korean concept of CSR, as the firm contributing to national economic development and making large charitable contributions (on average, 4.8 percent of operating income in 2010) (Choi, Lee & Park, 2013:447). They hypothesized that the manipulative use of CSR would be higher within Chaebol firms, and lower in firms without concentrated institutional ownership. Choi et al. used an index published by the Korea Economic Justice Institute (KEJI) to evaluate firms’ CSR activities, and calculated abnormal discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management.

Their results were generally as would be expected (and perhaps hoped for): earnings quality was higher in firms with stronger CSR performance, supporting the long-term hypothesis, but lower in Chaebol-affiliated firms, suggesting an abuse of CSR to mask managerial opportunism in those firms. Second, Choi et al. found that domestic long-term investors act as active monitors, weakening the propensity of managers to use CSR to mask opportunism, but that this salutary effect of long-term investors is not seen with respect to foreign investors. This last result is particularly of note. Corporate governance scholarship within law has emphasized board composition and independence as key mechanisms for monitoring corporate management on behalf of shareholders. Choi et al.'s results suggest that shareholder composition ought to be evaluated carefully as well for its monitoring capacity, as has recently been suggested by Gilson and Gordon in their analysis of “agency capitalism,” in which they evaluate differences between the monitoring capacity of diversified institutional investors versus activist shareholders such as hedge funds (Gilson & Gordon, 2013).

The paper by Collins Ntim and Teerooven Soobaroyen, “Corporate Governance and Performance in Socially Responsible Corporations in South Africa: New Empirical Insights from a Neo-Institutional Framework,” combines theory with empirical investigation to evaluate whether corporate governance mechanisms can influence the contributions of CSR to corporate financial performance. Recognizing that there have been weak and inconsistent results from the evaluation of CSR as a contributor to better financial performance, Ntim and Soobaroyen hypothesize that the association between CSR and better financial performance can be strengthened through good corporate governance (high levels of accountability, responsibility, and transparency), such as those set forth in South Africa by the King Committee's two reports (King Committee, 1994, 2002) and required (with respect to disclosure) by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. As they point out, the King Committee adopted an “inclusive approach” to corporate governance in South Africa, encouraging companies to comply with a broad range of stakeholder and CSR issues, such as advancing black economic empowerment, promoting proactive environmental policies, addressing health, safety, and HIV/Aids issues, acting ethically, and engaging in social investment (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013:Appendix). Ntim and Soobaroyen's research design focused on the 15 largest firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange within five industries (basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, industrials, and technology/telecoms) over the 2002–2009 period during which the King II Committee requirements were operative. CSR is measured by disclosure with respect to six categories of social information required by King II; CG is measured by disclosure with respect to four broad areas (boards, directors, and ownership; accounting; risk management, internal audit, and control; and compliance and enforcement) (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013:468 and Table 1). For financial performance, Ntim and Soobaroyen used Tobin's Q, total share returns, and return on assets.

Their findings show that, “on average, better-governed corporations are [statistically significantly] more likely to pursue a more socially responsible agenda” (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013:468), as measured by disclosure about specific CSR initiatives. Board diversity, board size, government ownership, and a greater percentage of independent non-executive directors all have a statistically significant and positive effect on disclosure about CSR initiatives, but increased block ownership and increased institutional ownership have a negative effect on CSR disclosure. They interpret this result “to indicate that institutional shareholders are more likely to be block owners, who can directly monitor managers instead of relying on CSR disclosures” (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013:468). Finally, while Ntim and Soobaroyen find the effect of CSR on corporate financial performance (CFP) to be weak and statistically insignificant, they also find that the higher the corporate governance quality, the more positive (and now statistically significant) is the link between CSR and CFP. This finding suggests that governments can have strong reasons to pursue efforts to improve the quality of corporate governance, since “evidence suggests that better-governed corporations are more likely to be more socially responsible,” and that “CG and CSR practices jointly impact positively on CFP” (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013:468). This finding points to a productive research agenda, offering a route to potentially explain prior findings of weak and inconsistent effects of CSR on CFP (Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003), since many studies have not looked at the interaction between CG and CSR and the joint effect on CFP.

The third empirical article, “Do Responsible Investment Indices Improve Corporate Social Responsibility? FTSE4Good's Impact on Environmental Management” by Craig Mackenzie, William Rees, and Tatiana Rodionova, investigates whether the possibility of being included or excluded from the FTSE4Good index has a significant effect on environmental management practices within firms. Mackenzie et al. take advantage of a number of features of the FTSE4Good process in structuring their investigation. The FTSE4Good index is developed in a multi-stakeholder process comprised of investors, CSR experts, and academics who translate generic CSR standards into a set of precise requirements, and then a specialized research agency (EIRIS) determines which companies meet the requirements (Mackenzie, Rees, & Rodionova, 2013:495). FTSE4Good reviews its standards and the composition of firms in the index every six months, and announces which companies have been included and which deleted. When it changes its standards, FTSE engages with companies that are not compliant with the new standards during a “grace period” to discuss changes, much as activist individual investors and hedge funds have been observed to engage on both corporate governance and CSR issues (Becht, Franks, Mayer, & Rossi, 2009; Dimson, Karakaş, & Li, 2012).

FTSE4Good strengthened their environmental management requirements in 2002, and engaged with members that failed to meet the new standards, with the threat of exclusion from the index if the new standards were not met by 2005. Mackenzie et al. thus used this as a natural experiment to evaluate the effect of index engagement, combined with the threat of expulsion, and found that engagement by the index, with the threat of expulsion, significantly increased the likelihood that a firm would meet the new environmental standards, and found that these effects persisted through to 2010 (Mackenzie et al., 2013:495). These effects were strongest in coordinated versus liberal market economies, while overall entrenched owners, including institutional investors, “hindered the CSR investment necessary for compliance” (Mackenzie et al., 2013:495). In other words, the threat of expulsion worked best with firms from coordinated market economies, while entrenchment was a disincentive everywhere.

In their findings, they also provide a response to the issue of pension fund responsibilities that motivates the pressures on fiduciary duties that Sandberg (2013) discusses. Rather than targeting the fiduciary duties of pension fund trustees, their research suggests that addressing the standards incorporated into CSR indices, and attending to the procedures of inclusion and exclusion, may be a more effective way for activist SRI investors (and regulators) to influence management decision making.

Future Directions in CSR-CG Research

  1. Top of page
  2. Corporate Governance Systems and CSR
  3. The Interaction Between CG and CSR Within the Firm
  4. Future Directions in CSR-CG Research
  5. References

Taken as a whole, one of the themes that emerges from this collection of papers is the role and responsibilities of shareholders in encouraging or resisting CSR efforts, however defined. If companies are managed to maximize the shareholder wealth from a collection of assets, what responsibilities do the shareholders have, or should they have, for the social effects that such a management focus generates? Can pension fund trustees make economic decisions about asset allocations for future beneficiaries 10, 20, 30, and 40 years in the future without considering future risks such as climate change, natural resource limits, population growth or economic inequality? Can widely-diversified, global investors play any kind of monitoring role over portfolio companies, and, if not, is that a governance concern? Is it a concern that CSR disclosure is weakened with block-holding institutional investors? Does weaker CSR disclosure necessarily mean weaker CSR practices? And are there other unexplored mechanisms, such as SRI stock or bond indexes, that can be used by activist investors and regulators alike to encourage corporate actions to better balance economic strategies with environmental sensitivity or productive social relationships? Underlying many of these questions is the need to continue to differentiate among different kinds of investors – particularly institutionalized investors – and to better understand the effects of different investors’ activism and engagement (or not) with issues of social importance.

Looking at CSR as a governance mechanism, as do institutional theorists, gives rise to a different set of questions. Governance scholars have begun to evaluate the effects of different types of regulatory approaches on compliance within firms and on engagement with the goals of the governance regime (Conglianese & Nash, 2006; Gunningham & Sinclair, 2009; May, 2005; Parker, 2002; Tyler, 1991). CSR as a governance regime will often incorporate industry self-regulation or multi-stakeholder governance. It has been suggested that this mode of regulation has the potential to engender better compliance than traditional “command and control” regulation (Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999; Parker, 2007; Rupp & Williams, 2011). There is also some evidence that participating over a period of years in an industry's CSR initiative can have an effect on firm culture, changing some of the procedures within the firm and changing some of the taken-for-granted ways of thinking (Conley & Williams, 2011; Eccles, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2012). With the proliferation of new forms of transnational business regulation (Calliess & Zumbansen, 2010), of which CSR is a prominent example, studies of the effects on firm culture and engagement with the goals of a governance regime from new governance approaches becomes a research question of first-order importance (Brammer et al., 2012). Business scholars, sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, and legal scholars all have contributions to make to this inherently interdisciplinary research task.

When we look at these papers from a more normative perspective – what managers do and what strategies or activities lead to what outcomes – we see that they have a lot to offer in terms of research guidance going forward. The conclusions that arise from much of the management research is that there is most likely a multifaceted and contingent relationship between what a firm seeks from using CSR activities and its various performance outcomes. However, exactly how these facets link together is complex and not well understood, with some work (e.g., Prior, Surroca, & Tribó, 2008) showing that firms use CSR for more nefarious purposes, while other work (e.g., Surroca, Tribó, & Waddock, 2010) hinting that, if used correctly, CSR reflects good managerial actions. As Devinney (2009) notes, there is nothing inherent about CSR that implies that it will be used for good or bad purposes; it is simply one reflection of managerial and firm choice that can be influenced quite dramatically by the environment within which it occurs. This is something quite clearly revealed by the work of Choi et al. (2013), Mackenzie et al. (2013) and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013).

The five papers in this special issue were culled from a much larger pool of papers that were not only reviewed but also presented at a workshop preceding the 5th International CSR Conference at Humboldt University-Berlin in 2012. The papers evaluated and presented were of very high quality with the ones chosen for publication being chosen not only for their quality but also for their positioning vis-à-vis the goal set out in our initial call for papers. Hence the value of the exercise was not simply to publish papers but to help scholars interested in CSR and CG to interact and improve on what they are doing by engaging in collective action. These papers should therefore be viewed in this light. They help serve as points of guidance, both theoretically and empirically, for our future research agenda.

Notes
  1. 1

    [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, para. 42.

  2. 2

    [2008] S.C.R. 560.

  3. 3

    Companies Act 2006, C. 46, Part 10, Chapter 2, The general duties, § 172.

  4. 4

    See Human Rights Council, Advance Edited Version, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-guiding-principles-21-mar-2011.pdf.

  5. 5

    Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).

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  2. Corporate Governance Systems and CSR
  3. The Interaction Between CG and CSR Within the Firm
  4. Future Directions in CSR-CG Research
  5. References
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