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Appendix B. Supporting the No Transgression Outcome in the Indefinitely Repeated CR Game with Standard Preferences Using the Trigger Strategies in Weingast (1995, 1997) Discussed in Footnote 4 in the Text.

Appendix C. Supporting the No Transgression Outcome in the Finitely Repeated CR Game with Standard Preferences Using the Trigger Strategies in Weingast (1995, 1997).

Appendix D. Equilibria in the One-Shot CR Game with Social Preferences and Incomplete Information.

Appendix E. Supporting the No Transgression Outcome in the Indefinitely Repeated CR Game with Social Preferences and Incomplete Information Using the Trigger Strategies in Weingast (1995, 1997).

Appendix F. An Equilibrium in the Indefinitely Repeated CR Game with Social Preferences and Incomplete Information in Which the Leader Punishes the Challenging Beneficiary.

Appendix G. Informative Cheap Talk in the CR Game with Social Preferences and Incomplete Information.

Appendix H. A model of CR Game with Social Preferences and Complete Information.

ecoj12088-sup-0002-DataS1.zipZip archive453K Data S1.

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