Whistling in 1929: Ramsey and Wittgenstein on the Infinite
Article first published online: 5 MAY 2014
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
European Journal of Philosophy
How to Cite
Methven, S. J. (2014), Whistling in 1929: Ramsey and Wittgenstein on the Infinite. European Journal of Philosophy. doi: 10.1111/ejop.12089
- Article first published online: 5 MAY 2014
Cora Diamond has recently criticised as mere legend the interpretation of a quip of Ramsey's, contained in the epigraph below, which takes him to be objecting to or rejecting Wittgenstein's Tractarian distinction between saying and showing. Whilst I agree with Diamond's discussion of the legend, I argue that her interpretation of the quip has little evidential support, and runs foul of a criticism sometimes made against intuitionism. Rather than seeing Ramsey as making a claim about the nature of propositions, as Diamond does, we should understand him as making a claim about the grammar of the logical connectives. Such a view coheres with the extant evidence of the nature of Wittgenstein's and Ramsey's 1929 philosophical encounters. It is also compatible with attributing to Ramsey a recognition of Wittgenstein's distinction and with denying that criticising it is the lesson of the quip.