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Delegated and Implementing Rule Making: Proceduralisation and Constitutional Design


  • Joana Mendes

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    • Assistant Professor, University of Amsterdam. I am very grateful to Eljalill Tauschinsky and to Thomas Christiansen for valuable comments.


The reform of non-legislative acts introduced by Articles 290 and 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union was guided by concerns regarding the democratic legitimacy of (lato sensu) implementing acts of the Union. However, it has ignored the centrality of transparency in the Union's democracy and the role of participation as a complementary source of democracy. This article argues that the procedures leading to the adoption of delegated and implementing acts are subject to the treaties' provisions on transparency and participation, and should be shaped by them. It analyses the constitutional choices underlying Articles 290 and 291, with a view to assessing whether and to what extent the material, organic and functional profiles of delegated and implementing acts condition procedural rules on transparency and participation to be followed in their adoption.