Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski are the first authors, and their names are listed in alphabetical order. The authors thank Burcu Ucaray Mangitli and Nihan Gunaydin for helpful assistance, the editors, and anonymous reviewers.
The Effects of Rivalry on Rivalry: Accommodation and the Management of Threats†
Article first published online: 2 MAY 2013
© 2013 International Studies Association
Foreign Policy Analysis
Volume 10, Issue 1, pages 81–100, January 2014
How to Cite
2013) The Effects of Rivalry on Rivalry: Accommodation and the Management of Threats. Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/fpa.12007, , and . (
- Issue published online: 10 JAN 2014
- Article first published online: 2 MAY 2013
The paper investigates how states manage multiple rivalries when faced with immediate threats. We argue that accommodation of one rival allows states to shift resources from the management of another rival to deal with the costs of immediate threats. By examining enduring rivalries from 1966 to 1999, we show that states' reliance on accommodation in response to threats varies depending on the number of severe threats and the relative capabilities between the states and the threat-issuing rivals. Findings show that when faced with severe but few threats, states prefer to accommodate rivals that did not issue the threat. They are also more likely to give larger concessions to such rivals and to those issuing less severe threats. Finally, the greater the military capability of a rival issuing a severe threat relative to that of the challenged state, the more likely that a threatening rival is accommodated.