Authors' notes: We thank many colleagues for helpful comments on various versions of this project, including Matt Baum, Michelle Benson, Chris Butler, Dave Clark, Paul Diehl, Dennis Foster, Liz Gerber, Pat James, Kelly Kadera, Jim Morrow, Ben Fordham, Scott Wolford, several anonymous reviewers, and many others at Buffalo, Penn State and the 2009 EITM summer institute. Previous versions of this paper were presented at ISA 2007, Peace Science 2006 and 2007, and EITM 2009. Any remaining errors are our own.
Diversionary Incentives, Rally Effects, and Crisis Bargaining†
Version of Record online: 2 OCT 2013
© 2013 International Studies Association
Foreign Policy Analysis
Volume 11, Issue 2, pages 233–250, April 2015
How to Cite
2013) Diversionary Incentives, Rally Effects, and Crisis Bargaining. Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/fpa.12025and . (
- Issue online: 5 APR 2015
- Version of Record online: 2 OCT 2013
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