The author thanks Glenn Palmer, Chris Zorn, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. All errors remain the author's.
A Story of Institutional Misfit: Congress and US Economic Sanctions†
Version of Record online: 15 AUG 2013
© 2013 International Studies Association
Foreign Policy Analysis
Volume 10, Issue 4, pages 431–445, October 2014
How to Cite
2014) A Story of Institutional Misfit: Congress and US Economic Sanctions. Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/fpa.12032. (
- Issue online: 6 OCT 2014
- Version of Record online: 15 AUG 2013
|fpa12032-sup-0001-Supplemental.pdf||application/PDF||213K||Appendix S1. OA 1 – Two-step estimation for US sanction duration; OA 2 – The effect of institutional origin on US sanction duration: Additional control variables; OA 3 – Testing US sanction duration: Treating target acquiescence cases as right-censored; OA 4 – Survival functions with confidence intervals; OA 5 – Testing for the proportional hazards assumption: log-log plot.|
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