SEQUENTIAL OR SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS? A WELFARE ANALYSIS

Authors

  • Patrick Hummel,

    1. Google Inc, U.S.A.
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  • Brian Knight

    1. Brown University, U.S.A.
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    • We thank Nageeb Ali, Gerard Padro i Miquel, conference participants at the Princeton Conference on Political Economy, the Center for the Study of American Politics Summer Conference, and the NBER Summer Institute, and seminar participants at the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Miami, Miami University, the University of Michigan, and the New Economic School. Please address correspondence to: Brian Knight, 64 Waterman Street, Providence, RI 02912. E-mail: Brian_Knight@brown.edu.


Abstract

Should all voters vote on the same day or should elections be staggered? Using a model of voting and social learning, we illustrate that sequential elections place too much weight on early states but also provide late voters with valuable information. Simultaneous elections equally weigh states but place too much weight on voter priors, providing an inappropriate advantage to front-runners. Simultaneous elections are thus preferred if the front-runner advantage is small, but sequential elections are preferred if the advantage is large. Our quantitative welfare analysis of presidential primaries suggests that simultaneous systems slightly outperform sequential systems.

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