Physicalism, as I treat it here, holds that every instance of causationreported by the special sciences is shadowed, even rivalled, by causation atthe level of microphysics. The reported ‘cause’ is embodied in one massive collection of microparticle events; the ‘event’ in another; the former brings about the latter in accordance with the laws of microphysics. I argue that while individual events in the ‘cause’ collection bring about individual events in the ‘effect’ collection, it does not follow, and typically is unbelievable, that the ‘cause’ collection itself brings anything about. For typically that collection is too sprawling and disconnected from the standpoint of microphysics to do anything. Causings reported by the special sciences can be traced only at that level. This is actually unsurprising, since the objects of such sciences are not mere parcels of microparticles, but genuine wholes with natures of their own.