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ARMSTRONG AND THE MODAL INVERSION OF DISPOSITIONS
Article first published online: 14 JUL 2005
DOI: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00410.x
1467-9213/asset/cover.gif?v=1&s=4c88bb37c0d1ac3a4cdf1f9c54754f293a87d73c "The Philosophical Quarterly")
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How to Cite
Handfield, T. (2005), ARMSTRONG AND THE MODAL INVERSION OF DISPOSITIONS. The Philosophical Quarterly, 55: 452–461. doi: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00410.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 14 JUL 2005
- Article first published online: 14 JUL 2005
D.M. Armstrong has objected that the dispositionalist theory of laws and properties is modally inverted, for it entails that properties are constituted by relations to non-actual possibilia. I contend that if this objection succeeds against dispositionalism, then Armstrong's nomic necessitation relation is also modally inverted. This shows that at least one of Armstrong's reasons for preferring a nomic necessitation theory is specious.