DO CATEGORICAL ASCRIPTIONS ENTAIL COUNTERFACTUAL CONDITIONALS?
Version of Record online: 14 JUL 2005
The Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 55, Issue 220, pages 495–503, July 2005
How to Cite
Choi, S. (2005), DO CATEGORICAL ASCRIPTIONS ENTAIL COUNTERFACTUAL CONDITIONALS?. The Philosophical Quarterly, 55: 495–503. doi: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00413.x
- Issue online: 14 JUL 2005
- Version of Record online: 14 JUL 2005
Stephen Mumford, in his book on dispositions, argues that we can distinguish between dispositional and categorical properties in terms of entailing his ‘conditional conditionals’, which involve the concept of ideal conditions. I aim at defending Mumford's criterion for distinguishing between dispositional and categorical properties. To be specific, no categorical ascriptions entail Mumford's ‘conditional conditionals’.