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VII—Vagueness and Existence
Article first published online: 7 SEP 2004
DOI: 10.1111/j.0066-7372.2003.00046.x
Issue
1467-9264/asset/cover.gif?v=1&s=a8877c7adc320dbf8b8a87713be92be387e6e664 "Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)")
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
Volume 102, Issue 1, pages 125–140, June 2002
Additional Information
How to Cite
Hawley, K. (2002), VII—Vagueness and Existence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 102: 125–140. doi: 10.1111/j.0066-7372.2003.00046.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 7 SEP 2004
- Article first published online: 7 SEP 2004
- Abstract
- Cited By
Abstract
Vague existence can seem like the worst kind of vagueness in the world, or seem to be an entirely unintelligible notion. This bad reputation is based upon the rumour that if there is vague existence then there are non-existent objects. But the rumour is false: the modest brand of vague existence entailed by certain metaphysical theories of composition does not deserve its bad reputation.