We would like to thank the editors of AJPS, the three anonymous reviewers, and the participants of the Political Economy of Conflict Conference at Yale University for their helpful comments and advice. We would also like to thank Ozan Sula for research assistance.
Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes
Version of Record online: 3 MAR 2004
American Journal of Political Science
Volume 48, Issue 2, pages 296–313, April 2004
How to Cite
Filson, D. and Werner, S. (2004), Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes. American Journal of Political Science, 48: 296–313. doi: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00071.x
- Issue online: 3 MAR 2004
- Version of Record online: 3 MAR 2004
Recent research suggests that democracies have advantages and disadvantages in wars. Democracies are more likely to win the wars they initiate and the ones in which they are targeted. Wars initiated by democracies are also uniformly shorter and less costly than wars initiated by nondemocracies. However, democracies are also less likely to continue fighting and less likely to win as war drags on. Democracies are also particularly likely to be targeted. We present a bargaining model that reconciles these divergent findings. The model explains why democracies are more likely to win but are also more likely to settle and more likely to be targeted than other types of regimes. The model's explanation of these facts differs in important ways from existing explanations. The model also suggests several new hypotheses relating regime type to the terms of settlement and the onset of war.