AUTHORS' NOTE: Earlier versions of parts of this article were presented at the 1998 meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association (Chicago) and the Florida Political Science Association (Orlando). Thanks to Charles W. Anderson, Cal Clark, Ray Fair, Jack Happy, John Irons, William Keech, William Niskanen, Helmut Norpoth, Sam Peltzman, Kathy Tempas, Chris Wleizen, and especially Gordon Tullock for their comments, critiques, and encouragement.
Fiscal Policy and Presidential Elections: Update and Extension
Article first published online: 13 FEB 2004
Presidential Studies Quarterly
Volume 30, Issue 2, pages 275–289, June 2000
How to Cite
CUZÁN, A. G. and BUNDRICK, C. M. (2000), Fiscal Policy and Presidential Elections: Update and Extension. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 30: 275–289. doi: 10.1111/j.0360-4918.2000.00112.x
- Issue published online: 13 FEB 2004
- Article first published online: 13 FEB 2004
- Cited By
This article updates, deepens, and extends previous articles published in this journal on the relation between fiscal policy and presidential elections. It presents evidence that is consistent with the view that voters reward fiscal frugality and punish fiscal expansion. The relationship is robust with respect to economic conditions, presidential incumbency, number of consecutive terms in the White House by presidents of the same party, and war. An intriguing finding is that, when fiscal policy is controlled for, incumbency advantage practically disappears. It is hoped that these findings will stimulate more political scientists, especially students of the presidency, to pay more attention to the role of fiscal policy in presidential elections.