AUTHOR'S NOTE: The author would like to thank the following individuals for their helpful comments on the ideas expressed in this article: Harold Bass, George Edwards, Linda Fowler, Mark Hansen, James Shoch, Lynn Vavreck, Stephen Weatherford, and Richard Winters. The author would also like to thank the Eisenhower Foundation for a grant to conduct archival research at the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas.
Conditional Partisanship and Institutional Responsibility in Presidential Decision Making
Article first published online: 16 FEB 2004
Presidential Studies Quarterly
Volume 30, Issue 3, pages 485–513, September 2000
How to Cite
SPILIOTES, C. J. (2000), Conditional Partisanship and Institutional Responsibility in Presidential Decision Making. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 30: 485–513. doi: 10.1111/j.0360-4918.2000.00125.x
- Issue published online: 16 FEB 2004
- Article first published online: 16 FEB 2004
- Cited By
The interaction of political incentives and institutional structures significantly shapes the nature of presidential decision making. This interaction generates a unique effect–institutional responsibility–which substantially constrains presidential response to partisan and electoral incentives present in the policy-making environment. After discussing institutional responsibility in the theoretical context of presidential decision making and political economy, the article illustrates this effect in the empirical context of economic policy making in the Eisenhower and Carter administrations. The article demonstrates that the interaction produces an institutionally generated incentive for responsible decision making that often works at cross-purposes with other exogenous incentives for presidential behavior. In doing so, the article develops complementary notions of conditional partisanship and institutional responsibility.