Harvard Business School and the National Science Foundation provided financial support. We thank seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago/Kellogg “Standards and Public Policy” Conference (Chicago, May 2004), Melbourne Business School, and the IDEI Conference on the Economics of the Internet and Software Industries (Toulouse, January 2005), as well as Philip Haile (editor), Ken Krechmer, Mark Lemley, Halla Yang, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Research support was provided by Aurora Bryant, Vicky Chang, Seung-ju Paik, Mimi Tam, and Olga Trzebinska. All errors are our own.
The rules of standard-setting organizations: an empirical analysis
Article first published online: 9 OCT 2008
The RAND Journal of Economics
Volume 38, Issue 4, pages 905–930, Winter 2007
How to Cite
Chiao, B., Lerner, J. and Tirole, J. (2007), The rules of standard-setting organizations: an empirical analysis. The RAND Journal of Economics, 38: 905–930. doi: 10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00118.x
- Issue published online: 9 OCT 2008
- Article first published online: 9 OCT 2008
This article empirically explores standard-setting organizations' policy choices. Consistent with our earlier theoretical work, we find (i) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (ii) a positive correlation between the sponsor friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with disclosure requirements, and the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is weaker when there is only a limited number of SSOs.