We would like to thank George Baker, Jed DeVaro, Paul Oyer, Michael Raith, Mark Westerfield, Julie Wulf, the editor (Mark Armstrong), and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.
Work-related perks, agency problems, and optimal incentive contracts
Article first published online: 28 JUN 2008
© 2008, RAND
The RAND Journal of Economics
Volume 39, Issue 2, pages 565–585, Summer 2008
How to Cite
Marino, A. M. and Zábojník, J. (2008), Work-related perks, agency problems, and optimal incentive contracts. The RAND Journal of Economics, 39: 565–585. doi: 10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00028.x
- Issue published online: 16 SEP 2008
- Article first published online: 28 JUN 2008
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