Law and Coherence
Article first published online: 25 FEB 2004
Volume 17, Issue 1, pages 87–105, March 2004
How to Cite
Hage, J. (2004), Law and Coherence. Ratio Juris, 17: 87–105. doi: 10.1111/j.0952-1917.2004.00257.x
- Issue published online: 25 FEB 2004
- Article first published online: 25 FEB 2004
Abstract. This paper deals with the questions of whether the law should be coherent and what this coherence would amount to. In this connection so-called “integrated coherentism” is introduced. According to integrated coherentism, an acceptance set is coherent if and only if it contains everything that should rationally be accepted according to what else one accepts and does not contain anything that should rationally be rejected according to what else one accepts. Such an acceptance set is ideally a theory of everything, including amongst others standards for rational aceptance. On the assumption that the law, as a social phenomenon, is what the best theory about the law says it is, the law must be coherent, because the best theory of the law is part of an integratedly coherent theory of everything. This view is compatible with Raz's view that the law stems from different sources that need not be coherent in the sense that they consistently elaborate the same underlying principles or policies. Raz's view is not a consequence of integrated coherentism, however.