Legitimacy without the Duty to Obey

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  • Versions of this article were given at the University of Bern, Switzerland, the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, UC Berkeley School of Law, Yale Law School, Washington and Lee University School of Law, and, initially, as the Gross Memorial Lecture at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law in 2001. I am grateful for the helpful comments of Bruce Ackerman, Michael Blake, Cory Brettschneider, Allen Buchanan, David Estlund, Alon Harel, Frances Kamm, Erin Kelly, Christopher Kutz, Daniel Markovits, Lukas Meyer, Arthur Ripstein, Mathias Risse, Frederick Schauer, Scott Shapiro, Alan Strudler, Dennis Thompson, Alec Walen, Bradley Wendel, Alan Wertheimer, and the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs. Support has been provided by the Edmond J. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics and the Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard University.

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