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Keywords:

  • altruism;
  • game theory;
  • Hamilton's rule;
  • harming;
  • helping;
  • inclusive fitness;
  • social evolution;
  • spite

Abstract

We investigate the selective pressures on a social trait when evolution occurs in a population of constant size. We show that any social trait that is spiteful simultaneously qualifies as altruistic. In other words, any trait that reduces the fitness of less related individuals necessarily increases that of related ones. Our analysis demonstrates that the distinction between ‘Hamiltonian spite’ and ‘Wilsonian spite’ is not justified on the basis of fitness effects. We illustrate this general result with an explicit model for the evolution of a social act that reduces the recipient's survival (‘harming trait’). This model shows that the evolution of harming is favoured if local demes are of small size and migration is low (philopatry). Further, deme size and migration rate determine whether harming evolves as a selfish strategy by increasing the fitness of the actor, or as a spiteful/altruistic strategy through its positive effect on the fitness of close kin.