I would like to thank Roger Noll, Tim Bresnahan, Pablo Spiller, Scott Smart, Daniel Spulber, Frank Wolak, Barry Weingast and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. This research was supported by a grant of the John and Mary Markle Foundation to the Center for Economic Policy Research at Stanford University.
The Consequences of Appointment Methods and Party Control for Telecommunications Pricing
Version of Record online: 13 JAN 2005
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Volume 3, Issue 2, pages 301–323, June 1994
How to Cite
Smart, S. R. (1994), The Consequences of Appointment Methods and Party Control for Telecommunications Pricing. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 3: 301–323. doi: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1994.00301.x
- Issue online: 13 JAN 2005
- Version of Record online: 13 JAN 2005
While the economic approach to the politics of regulation emphasizes the importance of organized economic interests in shaping policies, political institutions in which regulatory agencies are embedded may also have significant effects. By including both economic influences and characteristics of political institutions in a model of price setting by state regulators, this paper demonstrates that both shape regulatory behavior in the telecommunications industry. Whether commissioners are elected or appointed, whether they face confirmation by a legislature, and whether a single party controls both executive and legislative branches of state governments influence the level of prices charged for basic services.