I would like to thank Roger Noll, Tim Bresnahan, Pablo Spiller, Scott Smart, Daniel Spulber, Frank Wolak, Barry Weingast and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. This research was supported by a grant of the John and Mary Markle Foundation to the Center for Economic Policy Research at Stanford University.
The Consequences of Appointment Methods and Party Control for Telecommunications Pricing
Article first published online: 13 JAN 2005
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Volume 3, Issue 2, pages 301–323, June 1994
How to Cite
Smart, S. R. (1994), The Consequences of Appointment Methods and Party Control for Telecommunications Pricing. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 3: 301–323. doi: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1994.00301.x
- Issue published online: 13 JAN 2005
- Article first published online: 13 JAN 2005
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